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The neuroscience of mind wandering has advanced appreciably over the past 
decade. By applying convergent methods that span self-reports, behavioral indexes, and 
neuroimaging, researchers have been able to gain an understanding of how the brain 
supports ongoing mentation that is unrelated to other tasks at hand. However, despite the 
complex processes that attention lapses can take, research in this field has often focused on 
simply dichotomizing mind wandering as either on-task or off-task. Furthermore, repeated 
use of tasks such as the sustained attention to response task (SART) to study mind 
wandering has constrained research and hampered generalizability. The current work 
addresses these issues by presenting a novel series of thought prompts that query several 
attention states and dynamics as participants perform the metronome response task (Seli et 
al., 2013). In Study 1, simultaneous recording of behavioral performance, fMRI, and pupil 
diameter allowed for a multimodal investigation of the neural correlates of attention lapses. 
In Study 2, task difficulty was manipulated in order to test the effect of cognitive load on 
attention lapses and performance. Results indicated unique behavioral and neural profiles 
for several attention states and found subtle but consistent differences between self-
reported attention state and performance variability. In addition, cognitive load modulated 
task performance and, to a lesser extent, the frequency of dynamic states (e.g., spontaneous 
versus constrained attention) in manners consistent with previous theorizing (e.g., the 
context regulation hypothesis). However, not all measures dissociated across attention 
states. The results are discussed from the perspectives of mind wandering theories and 
 x 
frameworks, the function of the default mode network, and the importance of task context 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The neuroscience of mind wandering has advanced appreciably over the past 
decade. By applying convergent methods that span self-reports, behavioral indexes, and 
neuroimaging (a process referred to as triangulation, Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), 
researchers have been able to gain an understanding of how the brain supports ongoing 
mentation that is unrelated to other tasks at hand. Whereas the default mode network 
(DMN) has been strongly implicated in supporting many of these processes, the role of 
multiple large-scale networks and their underlying dynamics has more recently been in the 
spotlight (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, and Andrews-Hanna, 2016). Furthermore, 
researchers have reliably documented the impact that failures of attention have on the task 
at hand. At the same time, research has emerged that suggests not all instances of mind 
wandering are inherently harmful (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). 
 In the current investigation, I conducted an in-depth examination of the neural 
mechanisms of attention lapses and tested recent theorizing regarding the dynamics of 
mind wandering. In addition, I examined the dichotomy of subjective attention states and 
behavioral performance and tested the effect of cognitive load on the prevalence and 
dynamics of off-task thought and other forms of distraction. This research consisted of two 
studies, across which I used a multimodal approach incorporating behavioral performance, 
functional neuroimaging, pupillometry, and self-report measures. Over the next sections, I 
review the literature behind mind wandering and attention lapses. I also present my 
methodology and analysis approach to address my research questions. To summarize the 
methodological approach, participants performed a continuous behavioral performance 
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task that has been shown to index mind wandering instances reliably. Intermittently, 
participants were presented with thought probes and asked to self-report their current state 
of thought. In Study 1, pupil diameter and fMRI were collected concurrently in order to 
examine the pupillometric and neural correlates of attention lapses. In Study 2, cognitive 
load was manipulated and performance and self-reported attention states were recorded. 
1.1 Current Definitions of Mind Wandering 
 Mind wandering research entered a new era with the rise of neuroimaging and, in 
particular, the discovery of the DMN. However, mind wandering has remained difficult to 
define scientifically. In layman’s terms, mind wandering has been thought of as the 
undirected, daydream-like processes that people experience when they are not otherwise 
focused on a task at hand. In the literature, however, mind wandering has taken on different 
definitions depending on the researchers and the studies. As discussed in Christoff (2012), 
the terms “mind wandering”, “spontaneous thought”, and “stimulus-independent thought” 
have been used interchangeably yet are not equivalent. Mind wandering has often been 
operationally defined as “task-unrelated thought” (Mrazek, Philips, Franklin, Broadway, 
& Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), but this is agnostic as to whether an 
instance of mind wandering is stimulus-independent or triggered by something in the 
environment. Similarly, stimulus-independent thought is simply that – thoughts generated 
by ongoing mental processes decoupled from the external environment. For example, a 
stimulus-independent thought can include an instance when one thinks about last summer’s 
vacation, whereas a stimulus-dependent thought can occur when one notices the loud 
noises from the MRI scanner. Stimulus-independent thoughts can be undirected (arising 
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spontaneously, such as suddenly remembering an upcoming deadline) or directed (as in 
planning events for the next day; Christoff, 2012).  
 Furthermore, one’s moment-to-moment stream of consciousness is not comprised 
solely of either on-task thoughts or mind wandering (defined in general terms as task-
unrelated thought). In the context of task performance, an individual may be completely 
focused on the task or may experience one of several types of lapses of attention: partaking 
in a mind wandering episode, thinking about topics related to the task at hand (referred to 
as “task-related interference”, such as the thought “How much longer will this take?”), or 
lapsing into a drowsy, inattentive state and not thinking about anything in particular. In 
addition, not just the content of one’s thoughts may vary on a moment-to-moment basis, 
but the dynamics of thoughts can fluctuate as well. A recent framework proposes that the 
dynamics of thoughts (i.e., how mental states change over time) need to be considered 
when defining and understanding mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2016; Mills, Raffaelli, 
Irving, Stan, & Christoff, 2017). In this framework, thoughts fall along a continuum and 
can range from spontaneous and freely moving (e.g., dreaming) to strongly constrained 
(e.g., directed problem solving). Christoff and colleagues propose that there is a low-to-
medium level of constraint during periods of mind wandering. As discussed later, 
emphasizing the dynamics of mind wandering and other thoughts has important 
implications and predictions for behavior and for the neural mechanisms underlying these 
processes.  
  Unfortunately, despite the number and dynamics of different attention states that can 
arise, most mind wandering studies have ignored this spectrum and have only focused on 
a subset of these states. For example, one of the most prominent fMRI studies in the mind 
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wandering literature, published by Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler 
(2009), only compared on-task and off-task thoughts, and whether individuals were aware 
of being off-task. The few studies that have examined the different types of off-task modes 
of attention indicate that it is still unclear how these different states may affect behavioral 
performance. For example, one study incorporated experience sampling with the sustained 
attention to response task (SART; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, and 
D’Argembeau, 2011a). The SART is a go/no-go task where participants are presented with 
single digit numbers and are instructed to respond quickly and accurately to each number 
but withhold their response to a target number (e.g., number 3). Stawarczyk and colleagues 
(2011a) found that reaction times (RTs) were faster for trials during on-task thoughts and 
task-related interference compared to external distractions and task-unrelated, stimulus-
independent thoughts. However, variance in RT as well as performance accuracy did not 
distinguish between any type of off-task thought. Similarly, Unsworth and Robison (2016) 
observed faster RTs on a sustained attention task during instances of on-task reports 
compared to all types of off-task reports. In terms of brain activity, Vanhaudenhuyse and 
colleagues (2011) reported increased fMRI activation in precuneus and posterior cingulate 
(DMN regions) when participants reported awareness of internal thoughts and feelings, 
whereas increased fMRI activation was observed in frontoparietal regions when 
participants reported awareness of external stimuli. 
To examine the neural correlates of attention lapses thoroughly and to test the effect 
that attention states have on performance, in the current research I approached the topics 
of mind wandering and other forms of distraction from a global perspective that 
encompasses both a range of attention states as well as their dynamics. The thought probes 
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used in the current research provided participants with options to classify their thoughts as 
either on-task (i.e., focused on the task assigned by the researcher), off-task (i.e., focused 
on thoughts unrelated to the assigned task), as task-related interference, or indicate whether 
they were in a state of lack of attention or drowsiness. Participants were further able to 
classify their off-task thoughts as 1) either related to something in their current environment 
(e.g., sights and sounds) or something internal in their mind (e.g., memories or plans) and 
2) as either constrained/directed or arising spontaneously. Including this range of attention 
states in the thought prompts provided the ability to more accurately investigate the neural 
correlates of attention lapses and understand how mind wandering and other attention 
fluctuations affect behavioral performance. In addition, this approach confers with the 
recent argument that mind wandering should be considered from a “family resemblances” 
perspective, where it is treated as a graded, heterogenous construct (Seli et al., 2018a). 
When referring to the current work, I use the terms on-task, task-related interference (TRI), 
off-task, and inattention to distinguish between these different attention states. For the 
characteristics of the off-task state, I use the terms external, internal, spontaneous, and 
constrained. However, in the review of the literature that follows, I use the terms “mind 
wandering”, “off-task”, and “attention lapses” interchangeably and in a more general 
manner, congruent with the articles referenced. 
1.2 Measuring Mind Wandering with Continuous Performance Tasks 
 A common way to measure how much an individual mind wanders or experiences 
task-unrelated thoughts is through probe-caught experience sampling: The researcher 
presents occasional thought probes during the course of the experiment, and the participant 
responds to the thought probes by indicating whether their attention was on-task or off-task 
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(Gruberger, Ben-Simon, Levkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015). Researchers then examine behavioral performance and the neural correlates during 
the moments preceding the off-task thought probes in comparison to on-task thought 
probes. As mentioned above, the SART has been a popular task choice among researchers. 
By combining the SART with experience sampling, researchers have documented negative 
correlations between SART accuracy and off-task thought (McVay & Kane, 2009; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2011a).  
 More recently, researchers have explored the extent to which behavioral tasks can 
capture fluctuations in attention and performance in an online manner as it happens. Being 
able to detect mind wandering as it happens has both theoretical and practical purposes, in 
that it may provide a means of detecting and then intervening as it occurs (Seli et al., 2013). 
Online detection of mind wandering could also enable improved understanding of the 
dynamics of mind wandering, as well as provide a means in which researchers can study 
mind wandering without relying on self-reports. In particular, researchers have examined 
how variability across continuous performance can be used as an indicator of mind 
wandering (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009; Seli et al., 
2013). For example, the SART can be analyzed with respect to RT variability. Henriquez, 
Chica, Billeke, and Bartolomeo (2016) observed abrupt increases in RT variability on go-
trials preceding mind wandering reports. Bastian and Sackur (2013) also administered the 
SART and calculated the coefficient of variability on the eight go-trials preceding each 
thought probe. They observed that increased RT variability preceded mind wandering 
reports, regardless of whether the particular mind wandering instance was self-caught or 
queried with a thought probe.  
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 Seli and colleagues (2013) extended this line of research. They developed the 
metronome response task (MRT) where participants tapped along to the sound of a 
metronome. Participants were also intermittently queried as to whether they were on-task 
or were mind wandering. To examine continuous performance variance, Seli and 
colleagues calculated for each tap the difference between each metronome onset time and 
its corresponding button press (referred to as rhythmic response time; RRT). They then 
calculated the RRT variance of the five taps preceding each thought probe. They observed 
increased RRT variability preceding instances when participants reported mind wandering.  
The work of Seli and colleagues (2013) and others (e.g., Bastian & Sackur, 2013) 
demonstrate that mind wandering can be indexed with continuous performance variability. 
Furthermore, the MRT developed by Seli and colleagues overcomes a number of 
limitations present in tasks that are commonly used to study mind wandering, such as the 
SART. The SART requires both response selection and response inhibition, and the rare 
critical trials may influence mind wandering processes (Cheyne et al., 2009). In addition, 
performance on the SART requires a speed-accuracy tradeoff, which may confound 
continuous patterns of performance indicative of mind wandering (Seli et al., 2013). In 
general, the MRT is a simple yet effective task that can index mind wandering processes 
and provide a method for investigating the effect of attention fluctuations on behavioral 
performance in an online manner. For the present work, I incorporated the MRT with the 
extended set of self-report attention categories described above. This combination allowed 
me to expand upon the results of Seli and colleagues (2013) by examining a broader range 
and dynamics of attention lapses. Furthermore, the MRT is amendable to cognitive load 
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manipulations. In Study 2, I included both an easy and difficult version of the MRT to 
examine the effect of task difficulty on performance and attention states. 
1.3 Behavioral Characteristics of Mind Wandering and Attention Lapses 
 A large amount of early research investigated behavioral and personality 
characteristics associated with mind wandering and related attention processes (e.g., 
daydreaming). Influenced by signal detection and vigilance research1, Antrobus, Coleman, 
and Singer (1967) recruited participants with high and low tendencies to daydream and 
administered a vigilance task where participants responded to one of two auditory tones. 
Participants were also presented with thought probes and indicated whether they 
experienced any task-irrelevant thoughts. Antrobus and colleagues observed that high 
daydreamers reported more off-task thoughts and low daydreamers reported fewer off-task 
thoughts. The researchers also observed a significant difference in performance at the end 
of the task between the two groups, in that high daydreamers performed significantly worse 
at the end of the task compared to low daydreamers.  
 Singer and Schonbar (1961) found that daydream frequency positively correlated 
with several characteristics, including night dream recall frequency, thematic creativity, 
achievement need, and anxiety. Singer and McCraven (1961) surveyed university students 
and found that the predominant content of daydreams consisted largely of practical 
concerns, and often were composed of visual imagery and oriented to the future. Klinger 
                                                 
1Note that along with mind wandering research, there is a large literature on vigilance, 
where performance decrement might reflect mind wandering as well. However, the 
literature reviewed in this manuscript is constrained to research on mind wandering and 
attention lapses studied with self-report. 
 9 
and Cox (1987) used experience sampling to study characteristics of thought in daily life. 
Similar to Singer and McCraven, Klinger and Cox found that thoughts were predominantly 
visual. The researchers observed that thoughts also often consisted of an inner monologue. 
In addition, thoughts were reported as either directed or undirected and either stimulus-
independent or dependent.   
 More recent research further builds on the behavioral characteristics associated with 
mind wandering. Typically, mind wandering is a negative consequence of failing to 
maintain attention to the task at hand. Mind wandering has been negatively correlated with 
poorer performance on a variety of tasks measured in the laboratory (e.g., working memory 
tasks and RT variability on continuous tapping tasks; McVay & Kane, 2009; Seli, Cheyne, 
& Smilek, 2013) as well as with performance on tasks that can occur outside the laboratory 
(e.g., SAT scores and reading comprehension; McVay & Kane, 2012; Mrazek et al., 2012). 
For example, Mrazek and colleagues (2012) found that mind wandering frequency 
measured during the administration of working memory and fluid intelligence tasks was 
negatively correlated with performance on the SAT taken one to three years earlier. Within 
the laboratory, Kucyi, Esterman, Riley, and Valera (2016a) observed increased RT 
variability in association with mind wandering. In this study, participants performed the 
gradual continuous performance task (gradCPT) in which they viewed gradually changing 
images of scenes. Participants were instructed to press a button for each city scene and 
withhold the button press for each mountain scene. Kucyi and colleagues observed positive 
correlations between increased off-task ratings at the end of each task block and both RT 
variability and commission errors.  Similarly, in a SART experiment, Bastian and Sackur 
(2013) observed increased RT variability during the eight trials preceding mind wandering 
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reports compared to on-task reports. Seli and colleagues (2013) observed increased 
performance variability during probe-caught mind wandering states compared to task-
focused states during performance of the MRT. In general, a close correspondence has been 
documented between diminished behavioral performance and mind wandering. 
However, mind wandering is not always associated with negative performance, and 
negative performance does not always indicate mind wandering. For example, Henriquez 
et al. (2016) observed increased RTs during instances of mind wandering in a sustained 
attention task. However, they also reported that 23% of slow RTs occurred during reported 
on-task instances. In addition, in the continuous performance task described above, Kucyi 
and colleagues (2016a) observed periods of mind wandering that corresponded with low 
performance variability. Furthermore, and as discussed in the next section in more detail, 
the effect of mind wandering on performance has been shown to interact with the cognitive 
load of the task at hand (Seli, Konishi, Risko, & Smilek, 2018b). In general, mind 
wandering and other attention lapses fluctuate throughout a task. Although mind wandering 
is strongly coupled with drops in performance, there does not always need to be a one-to-
one correspondence between attention lapses and performance. Rather, individual 
differences (e.g., working memory capacity, Levinson et al., 2012) and, as discussed in the 
next section, various task characteristics such as the level of task demand (Seli et al., 2018b) 
play an important role (Godwin et al., 2017). 
1.4 Cognitive Load, Performance, and Mind Wandering 
The frequency of mind wandering, and the extent to which mind wandering can 
adversely affect performance, can be modulated by various characteristics of the task at 
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hand. A consistent finding in research is that individuals tend to mind wander while 
engaged in easy tasks compared to difficult tasks. Early research by Antrobus (1968) 
demonstrated that the frequency of stimulus-independent thoughts decreased as a tone 
detection task increased in difficulty (i.e., as the number of tones and the presentation rate 
of each tone increased). Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, and Baddeley (1993) found that 
increases in memory load and presentation rate attenuated the frequency of stimulus-
independent thought.  
More recently, an experiment by Forster and Lavie (2009) was conducted with an 
emphasis on perceptual load and mind wandering. In this task, participants performed a 
visual search task under low and high perceptual load and reported whether their thoughts 
were on-task or off-task. Forster and Lavie observed a decrease in the number of task-
unrelated thoughts for the high perceptual load condition. Using a similar procedure, 
Levison, Smallwood, and Davidson (2012) examined individual differences and mind 
wandering under low and high perceptual load. Levison et al. observed that individuals 
with greater working memory capacity reported increased task-unrelated thoughts under 
low perceptual load, suggesting that when a task is relatively easy for an individual, and 
when that individual has high working memory capacity, he or she can lapse into a state of 
mind wandering while still maintaining performance on the task at hand.  
Other research has also examined the effect of task demand on mind wandering. In 
Smallwood et al. (2009), participants reported more task-unrelated thoughts when 
performing an undemanding choice response task than when performing a working 
memory task. Despite the increase in off-task thoughts in the choice response task, 
performance was higher in this condition as well. Similar patterns of task-unrelated 
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thoughts were observed across tasks in a related study (Smallwood et al., 2011). To take a 
closer look at the effect of cognitive load on mind wandering, Seli, Risko, and Smilek 
(2016) manipulated the difficulty of the SART by making the presentation of the digits 
either random or predictable. Throughout the task, participants were presented with thought 
probes asking about their attention focus, including whether their off-task thoughts were 
intentional or unintentional. Seli and colleagues observed an increase of intentional off-
task thoughts during the easy condition and an increase of unintentional off-task thoughts 
during the difficult condition.  
The relationship between cognitive demand and mind wandering has been important 
for theory-driven research in mind wandering. In regard to mind wandering theories, a 
handful of prominent theoretical models have been developed to explain the cognitive 
processes of mind wandering and the role of executive control. Smallwood and Schooler 
(2006) proposed the Attentional Resources account and argued that mind wandering 
consumes executive resources. More specifically, in this account, executive control does 
not initiate mind wandering episodes, but rather can be recruited to sustain thought that is 
decoupled from the primary task but which may be related to other goals of the individual 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In this sense, mind wandering would be more frequently 
observed in easy tasks, where there would be sufficient remaining executive resources to 
guide off-task thought with little or no detriment to performance. In contrast, McVay and 
Kane (2010) argued in their Executive Control Failures x Concerns account that mind 
wandering represents a failure of executive control to combat interfering thoughts. In this 
sense, mind wandering decreases during challenging tasks because of the increase of 
executive control mechanisms that guide task processing and defend against interfering 
 13 
off-task thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2010). A more recent perspective on mind wandering 
has attempted to reconcile the different implications of the models described above. 
Smallwood (2013) suggested that it is important to distinguish how mind wandering occurs 
and why it occurs. Mind wandering may often occur because of failures of executive control 
to inhibit distracting thoughts, as argued by McVay and Kane (2010). However, once 
initiated, mind wandering may continue due to decoupling from the external environment 
and due to control processes directing off-task thought towards other goals and concerns 
of the individual (Seli et al., 2018b; Smallwood, 2013).  
To further address the role of executive function in mind wandering, Smallwood and 
Andrews-Hanna (2013) recently proposed the context regulation hypothesis: When 
cognitive demand is high, executive function is employed to suppress mind wandering; 
when cognitive demand is low, executive function mechanisms can be allocated to guide 
task-unrelated thoughts without necessarily a detriment to task performance. In this sense, 
the context regulation hypothesis can also predict the types of off-task thoughts one may 
experience during a particular task. For example, this hypothesis predicts that future-
oriented thought, which often includes executive function processes such as 
autobiographical planning (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), occurs less frequently when a 
task places high demand on executive function. Indeed, this effect was observed by 
Smallwood et al. (2009): Participants reported fewer future-oriented thoughts during a 
working memory task compared to passive viewing and choice RT tasks. Predictions 
generated from the context regulation hypothesis can also be extended to the dynamics of 
thought. As discussed below, spontaneously-driven thoughts are likely generated by 
hippocampal and medial temporal lobe mechanisms and occur with little control or effort 
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(Ellamil et al., 2016). Conversely, the processes supporting constrained, or directed, 
thoughts likely involve executive control processes to drive this dynamic of thought 
content in a directed, top-down manner (Christoff et al., 2016). Therefore, one prediction 
is that constrained thoughts are more likely, and less deleterious to performance, under low 
cognitive demand than high cognitive demand. 
1.5 Neural Mechanisms of Mind Wandering and Attention Lapses 
The DMN is the most commonly implicated brain network in mind wandering. The 
DMN is a set of functionally connected brain regions including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, medial temporal lobes, and posterior cingulate and precuneus. The DMN was first 
documented as a brain network that decreases its activity during externally-directed, 
attention demanding tasks when compared to periods of awake rest (Gusnard & Raichle, 
2001; Raichle, 2001; Raichle, 2015). Following its discovery, the DMN has been 
frequently associated with instances of mind wandering and related spontaneous thought 
processes (Andrews‐Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, 
Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007; Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maquet, & D'Argembeau, 2011b). For example, Mason and colleagues (2007) 
observed a greater number of reported mind wandering instances during a practiced task 
compared to a novel version of the same task. When participants completed the practiced 
and novel task versions during fMRI acquisition, the researchers reported greater DMN 
recruitment during the practiced tasks, suggesting that the DMN is associated with mind 
wandering processes (Mason et al., 2007). To more directly assess the relationship between 
mind wandering and the DMN, Christoff and colleagues (2009) incorporated experience 
sampling with the SART while collecting fMRI data and observed increased DMN 
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recruitment during off-task thoughts. Additional research has used retrospective 
questionnaires after the completion of a scan to assess mind wandering and its relationship 
with the DMN (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010). Although the 
DMN has been strongly implicated in mind wandering processes, more recently it has been 
posited to support a broad range of internally-directed cognitive processes and self-
generated content (Spreng, 2012; Zabelina & Andrews-Hanna, 2016), including problem 
solving (Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011), planning (Spreng, Stevens, 
Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010), and creative idea generation (Ellamil, Dobson, 
Beeman, & Christoff, 2012).  
However, the DMN is not the only network likely involved in mind wandering. 
Activation in the frontoparietal control network (FPCN), which consists of executive 
control regions such as the dlPFC and anterior inferior parietal lobule, has been reported 
along with DMN activity during instances of mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009). 
Although the FPCN has traditionally been associated in opposition to the DMN and off-
task thought (Fox et al., 2005), a growing consensus suggests that the FPCN can couple 
with the DMN to guide periods of mind wandering that involve goal-directed cognition 
(Christoff et al., 2016; Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Zabelina 
& Andrews-Hanna, 2016). In a recent meta-analysis of fMRI studies investigating mind 
wandering, Fox and colleagues concluded that along with the DMN, mind wandering is 
likely further supported by mechanisms involving the FPCN, the secondary somatosensory 
cortex, insula, and lingual gyrus (Fox et al., 2015). Christoff and colleagues (2016) extend 
this further. As discussed earlier, mind wandering can be characterized by the dynamics of 
thought, such as whether thoughts are driven spontaneously or are constrained by top-down 
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processes (Christoff et al., 2016). In their recent framework, Christoff and colleagues 
(2016) propose a set of relationships between thought dynamics and large-scale brain 
networks. Specifically, spontaneous, internally-oriented thoughts are driven by the medial 
temporal lobe regions of the DMN which strongly influence other DMN regions along with 
the salience network. However, there is little influence from top-down control regions such 
as the FPCN. Conversely, during deliberate, constrained thoughts, the FPCN exerts strong 
influence on the DMN and salience network. This then minimizes the influence of the 
medial temporal lobes on the variability and spontaneity of thought. Despite this 
framework, to date no empirical research has investigated the neural correlates of 
constrained and spontaneous thought (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2017). Another goal of the 
current study is to test this set of relationships outlined in the framework of Christoff et al. 
(2016).  
Regarding attention states more generally, researchers have also documented sets of 
brain regions associated with internal and external awareness. As described above, 
Vanhaudenhuyse and colleagues (2011) reported increased fMRI activation in precuneus 
and posterior cingulate (DMN regions) when participants reported awareness of internal 
thoughts and feelings, whereas increased fMRI activation was observed in FPCN regions 
when participants reported awareness of external stimuli. Dixon, Fox, and Christoff (2014) 
further summarized the distinction between internally and externally directed cognition and 
associated a set of brain regions with each process. Internally directed cognition involves 
the regions of the DMN along with the MTL. These regions support many different 
internally-directed processes including self-referential thought, memory retrieval, and 
simulating future events. Externally directed cognition involves primary and associative 
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visual and auditory cortices for processing incoming sensory information, and primary 
motor and premotor regions for action associated with external stimuli. In addition, 
attention regions including the FEF and IPS are important for externally directed cognition 
due to their roles in enhancing processing of spatial locations and stimuli (Dixon et al., 
2014). Dixon et al. also highlight the role of the lateral PFC, which supports both internally 
and externally directed cognition. In particular, this region is typically recruited during 
instances of intentional, top-down cognitive processes and guides internally and externally 
directed cognition based on the current goals of the individual. 
Finally, research has begun to examine how brain networks support fluctuations in 
attention toward and away from particular tasks. Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendelhall, Duncan, 
and Barsalou (2012) employed a meditation task and observed that certain brain networks 
correspond to different stages of attention fluctuations. Specifically, the researchers 
investigated four stages: mind wandering, awareness of mind wandering, shifting of 
attention, and sustained attention. Similar to previous research, activation in the DMN was 
observed during mind wandering, and activation in regions of the FPCN was observed 
when participants focused on the task. In addition, activation in right dorsolateral PFC and 
lateral inferior parietal regions was observed when participants shifted their attention back 
to the task, suggesting that regions of the FPCN may be recruited to transition from an off-
task attention state back to a task-focused state.  
Christoff and colleagues (Christoff et al., 2016; Ellamil et al., 2016) proposed that 
medial temporal regions of the DMN drive the activation and variability of spontaneous 
thoughts. That is, the medial temporal lobes contribute to the diversity of mind wandering 
content by means of reactivating old thoughts and memories, or by generating novel 
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combinations of thoughts and memories. Once thoughts are generated, other networks such 
as the salience network and FPCN come online to constrain and modulate thought flow 
(Christoff et al., 2016). The salience network, comprised of the anterior insula and ACC, 
has been associated with identifying personally relevant and salient information (Seeley et 
al., 2007). In terms of mind wandering, the salience network may function as a network 
that couples with the DMN or FPCN to shift attention to either internally-directed or 
externally-directed information that is particularly relevant (Christoff et al., 2016). 
1.6 Pupillometry as an Index of Attention Fluctuations 
In the past few years, a growing interest has emerged in using pupil diameter as a 
covert indicator of attention lapses and mind wandering. This interest has stemmed from 
evidence that suggests that pupil diameter covaries with locus coeruleus (LC) activity, even 
in the absence of external stimuli (Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016). Although the 
mechanisms driving this relationship are still under investigation (Costa & Rudebek, 
2016), an important consequence of LC activity is the release of norepinephrine (NE) 
throughout the brain. NE influences both excitatory and inhibitory signals and can 
modulate the overall gain of neurons (Joshi et al., 2016). Furthermore, the relationship of 
the LC-NE system and cognitive function can be interpreted in the context of adaptive gain 
theory (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Here, two stages of LC activity exist: 1) a phasic 
stage, in which LC exhibits increases in activity in response to task-related decisions and 
which drives further focus on the task at hand, and 2) a tonic stage, in which LC exhibits 
baseline levels of activity that drive disengagement from current tasks and toward alternate 
activities. The tonic stage is of particular relevance to the proposed project. Following a 
Yerkes-Dodson relationship, if there is too little tonic LC activity, an individual will be in 
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an unaroused state and demonstrate poor behavioral performance. If there is too much tonic 
LC activity, the individual will be in an overly aroused state in which hypervigilance and 
increased attention can lead the individual to distraction and poor behavioral performance 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005).  
Because the LC-NE system has been linked to pupil diameter, measurements of pupil 
diameter may serve as a potential covert index of physiological arousal and fluctuations in 
attention (Kahneman, 1973). Previous research has documented that decreased tonic LC 
firing is associated with drowsiness and poor attention. Excess tonic LC firing is also 
detrimental to performance (Lenartowicz, Simpson, & Cohen, 2013). Other research has 
examined the hypothesis that pupil diameter can relate to attention fluctuations as indicated 
by self-reports of mind wandering. In one study (Franklin, Broadway, Mrazek, Smallwood, 
& Schooler, 2016), participants read passages one word at a time and were probed 
periodically regarding the focus of their attention. The researchers observed increased pupil 
diameter during a period of 10 seconds preceding self-reports of mind wandering compared 
to on-task. In a set of experiments, Smallwood and colleagues (2011) found that pupil 
diameter was larger preceding incorrect responses to working memory probes than correct 
responses. The researchers also documented greater pupil diameter during the performance 
of a simple choice response task compared to a demanding working memory task. 
Smallwood and colleagues confirmed in a second experiment using experience sampling 
that participants were more likely to mind wander during the choice response task. They 
proposed that the combination of the two experiments suggests that pupil diameter 
measurements may reflect periods of mind wandering.  
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Recently, Unsworth and Robison (2016) examined pupil diameter in response to 
attention lapses while participants performed a sustained attention task in which they 
focused on a row of zeros on a computer screen and pressed a button as soon as the values 
started increasing. Intermittently, the researchers probed participants regarding their focus 
of attention. Unsworth and Robison noted that baseline pupil diameter varied based on the 
type of self-reported attention state. In general, pupil diameters preceding on-task trials did 
not differ from normalized mean pretrial baseline diameter. However, external distraction 
was associated with large increases in baseline pupil diameter, and mind wandering was 
associated with smaller baseline pupil diameters compared to on-task self-reports. These 
important findings indicate that different attention lapses can be associated with differences 
in pupil diameter measurements. However, these findings contradict the research described 
above that suggests mind wandering is associated with increased baseline pupil diameter 
(Franklin et al., 2016, Smallwood et al., 2011, Smallwood et al., 2012). By building on the 
advantages of the MRT procedure and the range of attention states probed during 
experience sampling, another goal of the current research is to more clearly delineate the 
relationship between pupil diameter and attention lapses. 
1.7 Attention Lapses and Performance 
Recently, continuous performance tasks have been used to examine behavioral and 
neural markers in mind wandering and attention more generally. Through these tasks, 
researchers have been able to assess more granularly the role of the DMN and other brain 
networks during fluctuations in performance and off-task attention states. Esterman, 
Noonan, Rosenberg, and DeGutis (2012) administered a continuous performance task 
during fMRI scanning and examined variability in RT across trials and commission errors 
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to targets. As expected, they observed increased DMN activity preceding lapses to targets 
and increased dorsal attention network (DAN) activity preceding correct responses to 
targets. The DAN is a network comprised of superior parietal regions and the frontal eye 
fields, and has been consistently linked with attending and responding to external task 
demands (Dixon, Andrews-Hanna, Spreng, Irving, & Christoff, 2016).  Interestingly, DMN 
activity increased during periods of low variability RT (“in the zone” performance) and 
decreased during periods of high variability RT (“out of the zone” performance). 
Furthermore, when participants made commission errors during in the zone performance, 
there was increased DMN activity compared to correct trials that occurred in the zone. Yet 
when participants made commission errors during out of the zone performance, there was 
decreased DAN activity compared to correct trials, and no changes in DMN activity. 
Esterman and colleagues proposed that the increased DMN activity during in the zone 
performance may reflect efficient, automatized performance of the task. A moderate 
amount of DMN activity may be beneficial to maintain task performance, yet substantial 
increases may prove to be detrimental.  
Another example of the neural mechanisms of continuous performance comes from 
Kucyi, Hove, Esterman, Hutchison, and Valera (2016b). They examined behavioral 
tapping variability during fMRI acquisition and observed increased activation in the DMN 
and insula during low-variability, “in the zone” performance whereas activation in the 
DAN and salience network increased during high-variability, “out of the zone” 
performance. Kucyi and colleagues proposed an explanation similar to that of Esterman 
and colleagues (2012): A moderate amount of DMN activation may be beneficial for 
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supporting performance of these types of continuous, attention-demanding tasks in an 
efficient manner.  
However, neither Esterman et al. (2012) nor Kucyi et al. (2016b) were able to tie their 
results directly to the implications of mind wandering and address how increased DMN 
could support both stable performance and off-task thought. To address this limitation, 
Kucyi and colleagues (2016a) examined mind wandering reports and behavioral 
performance simultaneously during fMRI. Here, participants performed the gradCPT. This 
task consisted of viewing gradually changing images of scenes. Participants were 
instructed to press a button for each city scene and withhold the button press for each 
mountain scene. After each block, participants rated the extent to which they were on-task 
or were mind wandering. When examining DMN activation preceding the thought prompts, 
Kucyi et al. (2016a) found independent, additive effects of self-report and RT variability. 
Overall, mind wandering was associated with greater RT variability. However, DMN 
activity was highest during off-task attention with stable RT, whereas DMN activity was 
lowest during on-task attention with variable RT. Kucyi et al. discussed potential 
interpretations of these findings and speculated that DMN activity may be driven by 
separate neurophysiological processes. For example, mind wandering may be time-locked 
to increases in DMN activation whereas decreases in DMN deactivation support stable 
behavior. Kucyi and colleagues further suggested that the relationship between variable 
behavior and decreased DMN activity could arise due to periods of perceived increases in 
cognitive demand, in which DMN deactivation increases. Although these interpretations 
are speculative, the findings from Kucyi et al. indicate that the relationship between 
performance and attention state is complex. Simultaneous consideration of both self-
 23 
reported mind-wandering and behavior could yield insights into the function of the DMN 
and other brain networks (Kucyi et al., 2016a). In the current research, a similar approach 
is taken with the MRT procedure to examine brain activity during stable and variable 
performance in both on-task and off-task attention states. 
1.8 Current Research and Hypotheses 
Research in attention and mind wandering has evolved dramatically over the recent 
years. Whereas previous research posited that mind wandering was merely spontaneous, 
unintentional thought driven mainly by the DMN, emerging studies using multimodal 
approaches and triangulation have revealed that mind wandering and related thought 
processes are complex and dynamic, driven by networks of interacting brain regions and 
with differing implications in performance. In addition, new theories and frameworks have 
been developed for these processes. With these, new questions arise that aim to elucidate 
the mechanisms and implications of mind wandering.  
The objective of this current work was to overcome the limitations of previous 
research that has dichotomized attention states as on-task and off-task and examine the 
behavioral and neural characteristics across a broad range of attention states and their 
dynamics by using a set of multimodal cognitive neuroscience methods. In addition, by 
isolating the characteristics of each attention state, this approach aims to provide a clearer 
understanding of off-task thoughts relative to on-task thought and other forms of attention 
lapses. My first goal addressed the replication and extension of previous research, where I 
further characterized the behavioral and neural correlates of a range of attention lapses 
using behavioral performance variability, fMRI, and pupillometry. Whereas numerous 
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previous studies have documented increased DMN activation during off-task attention 
states compared to on-task states (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009), it is less clear how brain 
activity varies across other distraction states such as task-related interference and 
inattentiveness. Furthermore, Christoff et al. (2016) proposed sets of brain networks 
involved in the dynamics of thought, including spontaneous and constrained thought, 
however this has not yet been empirically investigated. Here, brain activation and 
functional connectivity within and between the DMN and FPCN were measured to 
examine the relative roles of each network in the dynamics of thought.  
In addition, pupil diameter has been associated with changes in attention state, but 
different studies have reported opposite findings regarding mind wandering and pupil 
diameter (e.g., Unsworth and Robison (2016) and Smallwood et al. (2011)). Unlike the 
sustained attention task of Unsworth and Robison (2016) and the choice response and 
working memory tasks of Smallwood et al. (2011), the MRT does not have a series of 
punctate stimulus presentations and response selection requirements that could affect 
event-related, phasic pupil diameter responses over and above attention fluctuations 
themselves. Therefore, the aim of this procedure was to provide a more fundamental 
approach to examining how tonic pupil diameter indexes fluctuations in attention, with the 
prediction that pupil diameter differentially corresponds to self-reported attention states. 
Furthermore, it may be possible that neural and pupillometric measures can distinguish 
different self-reported attention states, even if behavior does not. This would be an 
important contribution to understanding the subtleties of how different attention states are 
implemented in the brain. 
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Regarding behavioral performance, it was predicted that, as in previous research (Seli 
et al., 2013), RRT variability would be increased during the off-task attention state. 
However, the implications of the other attention states on performance, and the extent to 
which these attention states differentially affect performance, is not clear. One of the goals 
here was to directly document and compare RRT variability across these different attention 
states. Although reaction time and related performance metrics (e.g., RRT) are fundamental 
measurements in cognitive psychology research, they are not without their limitations. 
These metrics typically follow an ex-Gaussian distribution, where a greater number of 
larger RTs or RT variances skew the distribution positively (Heathcote, Popiel, & 
Mewhort, 1991). However, the extent to which a sample of performance data follows this 
distribution can provide an interesting perspective into the mechanisms governing each 
instance of performance (Schmiedek, Oberaurer, Wilhelm, Sub, & Wittmann, 2007). 
Therefore, to obtain further insight into behavioral performance across attention states, ex-
Gaussian parameters (mu, sigma, and tau) were estimated from the raw RRT values for the 
attention states in the first thought-prompt (on-task, TRI, off-task, and inattentive). 
The next goal here was to test the extent that performance and self-reported attention 
state are dissociable. Although the majority of research has documented congruency 
between poor performance and off-task attention states (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009), this is 
not always the case (e.g., Henriquez et al., 2016). In general, it is likely that across mind 
wandering episodes, there are instances of good performance and poor performance. 
Similarly, across periods of on-task attention states, there are instances of both good and 
poor performance. However, the neural mechanisms that guide strong performance during 
periods of distraction and which diminish performance during periods of focus are not 
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clear. Recently, as described above, Kucyi et al. (2016a) demonstrated that RT variability 
and self-reported attention provided independent, additive effects in predicted DMN 
activation. The current work addressed this topic in a manner similar to Kucyi et al. 
(2016a). The analysis focused on the on-task and off-task reports from the first prompt and 
divided the trials into high and low performance variability (e.g., Esterman et al., 2012) to 
conduct a quadrant state analysis (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 – The quadrant state analysis approach 
Although the task in Study 1 remained constant, as discussed in Kucyi et al. (2016a), 
it was possible that there were “perceived” transient changes in cognitive demand across 
continuous performance tasks. To guide analysis, a set of hypothesized characteristics of 
each of the four quadrant states was organized based on potential variations in cognitive 
demand across the task. The instances where participants reported being on-task and were 
able to maintain focus to perform the MRT with low variability (Figure 1: on-low) were 
considered to reflect the “in the zone” epochs of Esterman and colleagues (2012) and Kucyi 
and colleagues (2016a), or a general “on-task” state. As in previous research (Esterman et 
al., 2012), a moderate amount of DMN activation was expected to support these processes. 
Conversely, instances where mind wandering was associated with increased variability in 
tapping performance (Seli et al., 2013; Figure 1: off-high) were considered to be periods 
of time where participants perceived the task as challenging, but they had disengaged from 
 27 
the task and shifted their attention to other matters of concern. (It would be unclear from 
the current procedure the extent to which individuals first perceived the task as challenging 
and then broke into mind wandering, or whether the task became challenging because of a 
decrease in attention to the task.) In these instances, increased DMN activation relative to 
the on-low condition was expected. It is less clear the implications of reporting off-task 
thoughts during periods of low variability (Figure 1: off-low). It is possible that these 
instances were similar to other cases noted in the literature in which individuals could mind 
wander in the presence of undemanding tasks (Godwin et al., 2017; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015). Here, it was predicted that mind wandering would be driven by both 
FPCN and DMN regions (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Finally, there was the possibility 
that high performance variability would be identified during on-task reports (Figure 1: on-
high). It is unclear what this would indicate, however one possibility is that these instances 
could reflect attempts at re-focusing attention to the task at hand. This may be similar to 
the stages in mind wandering proposed by Hasenkamp and colleagues (2012) in which 
individuals noticed they were off-task and attempted to shift their attention back on track. 
Behavioral variability may have indicated that the individual was “off-task”, but the 
individual may have reported being on-task as he or she attempted to regain focus by 
thinking about the task. From this perspective, increased activation in the salience network 
was predicted (Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Kucyi et al., 2016a). 
Finally, a remaining goal was to examine the effect of cognitive load on performance 
and the types of attention states one experiences when under different levels of load. 
Although previous research suggests that mind wandering decreases under increased load 
(Seli et al., 2018b), this is not always the case (e.g., Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013). In 
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addition, it was less certain the extent to which other forms of distraction are experienced 
across cognitive load levels. By directly manipulating task difficulty in Study 2, I was able 
to examine this. Furthermore, the context regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013) generates some interesting predictions regarding the dynamics of thought as 
a function of cognitive load. For example, if constrained thoughts are largely supported by 
executive function and the FPCN as proposed by Christoff et al. (2016), then these thoughts 
should occur more frequently during easy tasks with low cognitive load. Conversely, if 
spontaneous thoughts are driven by the DMN and medial temporal lobe regions and are 
relatively independent of executive function, then they may occur equally across difficulty 
levels, or be relatively more frequent in difficult task conditions. More specific predictions 
can be made regarding task performance depending on the attention state and task level. 
For example, when constrained thoughts are observed under increased demand, there could 
be corresponding decreases in performance due to the inability of executive function to 
optimally guide both processes. Answering these questions would provide additional 
empirical evidence for the framework proposed by Christoff and colleagues (2016) and 
further understanding of the role of task difficulty in mind wandering. 
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CHAPTER 2. STUDY 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 35 participants (17 female, 17 male, 1 no response) were recruited from the 
Georgia Institute of Technology. Due to technical difficulties with the MRI scanner, the 
datasets from the first two participants were excluded. Two additional participants were 
excluded due to scanner contraindications. Therefore, 31 participants were included in 
behavioral and MRI analyses. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 23 (M = 20, SD = 
1.6). All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and 
were not contraindicated for the scanner. In addition, eye tracking datasets were collected 
from a subset of these participants (n = 24) and were included in pupil diameter analysis. 
2.1.2 Metronome Response Task 
Participants were instructed to keep their eyes open and focus on a fixation in the 
center of the screen. Participants performed the MRT across a series of tap periods. For 
each tap period, participants were instructed to tap along as synchronously as possible to a 
metronome sound. The metronome tone consisted of a 450-Hz sine wave presented for 75 
ms (following parameters of Kucyi et al., 2016b and Seli et al., 2013). Each metronome 
tone was preceded by 650 ms of silence and followed by 575 ms of silence (following the 
MRT procedures of Seli et al.). Thus, across the tap periods the metronome sounded at a 
rate of approximately .77 Hz (one tone per 1300 s). Each tap period was preceded by a 
short baseline fixation with a 2 – 4 s variable duration. The fixation cross remained on the 
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screen across the duration of the tap periods. Participants had a 4-button response box and 
were instructed to tap by pressing the button under their right index finger. After each tap 
period ended, the metronome stopped and participants were presented with the thought 
probes. 
2.1.3 Thought Probes 
Participants were presented with a set of thought probes at the end of each tap period 
that asked them to classify the attention state they were in just prior to the onset of the 
probe. The first thought probe followed those from Stawarczyk et al. (2011) and Unsworth 
and Robison (2016): 1) on-task, 2) task-related thoughts, 3) off-task, and 4) not alert / 
drowsy. Participants had 6 s to select their response via button-press. After selecting the 
response, the prompt remained on the screen until the end of the 6 s, and participants could 
change their response if desired.  
Following the first prompt, if participants did not select the off-task option, they were 
then presented with a fixation for the next 10 s. If participants selected the off-task option, 
they were then presented with two additional prompts to further address the nature of off-
task thought. The second prompt addressed the environmental nature of the off-task 
thought: 1) surrounding environment, 2) internal thoughts. The third prompt addressed the 
dynamics of thought, following theorizing by Christoff et al. (2016) and Mills et al. (2018): 
1) freely moving, 2) constrained. Each of these prompts was presented for an additional 5 
s and remained on the screen for the full length of time. 
 
 31 
2.1.4 Eye Tracking 
Pupil diameter was measured during the main experiment with an EyeLink 1000 Plus 
MRI-compatible eye tracker. Eye tracking data was sampled at a rate of 1000 Hz. A 5-
point calibration was performed at the start of the first run, and a validation procedure was 
performed at the start of the subsequent four blocks. 
2.1.5 fMRI Design 
Imaging was conducted on a Siemens 3T Trio MRI scanner at the Georgia Institute 
of Technology. All participants completed a T1-weighted MPRAGE anatomical scan with 
the following acquisition parameters: FoV = 256 mm; 176 slices; 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm3 
voxels; flip angle = 9˚, TE = 3.98 ms; TR = 2250 ms; TI = 850 ms.  
Participants then completed the main experiment over the course of five runs (run 
duration = 10 min, 33 s). During each run, functional T2*-weighted echo-planar scans were 
collected with the following acquisition parameters: FoV = 204 mm; slices = 37; 3.0 x 3.0 
x 3.0 mm3 voxels; interleaved slice acquisition; gap = 0.5 mm; flip angle = 90˚; TE = 30 
ms; TR = 2000 ms. 
2.1.6 Experimental Procedure 
The MRT was run using E-Prime software. All visual stimuli were presented in white 
font on a black background. In order to familiarize participants with the MRT, a practice 
session was held outside the scanner before the main experiment began. The experimenter 
explained the meaning of each thought probe category and provided examples as needed 
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(Appendix A). The participants then performed five trials at a desktop computer to become 
familiar with the act of tapping and reporting attention states.  
The main experiment consisted of five runs of 15 tap periods per run. At the start of 
each tap period, participants focused on a fixation cross in the center of the screen. This 
fixation served as the baseline with a variable duration (2 – 4 s). Following the baseline, 
the fixation remained on the screen and the metronome started to sound. Participants were 
instructed to begin tapping as soon as they heard the metronome and to tap along as 
synchronously as possible for the duration of the tap period. The duration of the tap periods 
varied and the number of tap periods of each duration followed approximately an 
exponential distribution and ranged as follows for each block: six tap periods of 16 s; three 
tap periods of 20 s; two tap periods of 24 s; two tap periods of 28 s; one tap period of 32 s; 
and one tap period of 36 s. The order in which these tap periods occurred within each block 
was randomized. The exponential distribution of tap period durations was used to minimize 
expectancy effects from participants. At the end of the tap period, participants were 
presented with the first thought probe and had 6 s to enter their response. If participants 
selected the “off-task” option, they were then presented with two additional thought probes 
(described under “Thought Probes”). If participants selected any of the other three options, 
they were presented with a 10-s fixation period until the next baseline and tap period began. 
This fixation period was included to equate the duration of the entire probe period, 
regardless of the selection participants made to the first prompt. Upon completion of the 




2.1.7 Data Processing and Analysis 
All behavioral, fMRI, and pupillometry analyses are based on the data of the last 5 to 
10 s preceding the thought probes. This duration is similar to that of other mind wandering 
studies using experience sampling during fMRI (Christoff et al., 2009) and should reliably 
capture the behavioral and neural correlates of attention fluctuations. In addition, all 
analyses required that each cell contain a minimum of two reports per participant. Cells 
with only one report per participant were excluded from the respective analysis. Unless 
otherwise noted, all behavioral and pupillometric inferential statistics were computed using 
linear mixed-effects models with the lme function from the nlme package in R. Linear 
mixed-effects models are extensions of the general linear model, and both fixed and 
random effects are modeled. These models have the advantage of being able to handle 
unbalanced designs and missing cells and have previously been used in mind wandering 
research to address these concerns (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). Post-hoc comparisons 
with Tukey correction were run using the glht function from the multcomp package in R.  
Preprocessing and Analysis of Behavioral Data. All behavioral analyses were 
conducted on the performance data from the last five metronome tones preceding the 
thought prompts (Seli et al., 2013); this makes up approximately the last 6.5 s of the tapping 
period. Before statistical analysis, performance accuracy was calculated for these five taps 
preceding each tapping period. All missing and incorrect taps were counted as errors. To 
be included in analysis, each trial needed to have at least three correctly performed taps out 
of the five total. With these exclusion criteria, an average of 3.53% (SEM = 1.39%) of trials 
were removed from each participant’s data.  
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The steps for behavioral data analysis of the MRT followed the procedures of Seli 
and colleagues (2013). For each participant for each tap period, the RRT was calculated 
from the last five metronome tones. The RRT was obtained by calculating the difference 
between the onset of the metronome tone and the corresponding time of key press. From 
here, the RRT variance was calculated from these values. Because the distribution of RRT 
variance is typically skewed right, a natural log transformation was applied to these values 
(Seli and colleagues, 2013). Transformed RRT variance served as the dependent variable 
in the behavioral data analysis.  
The frequency of each attention state in Prompt 1 was calculated as a proportion out 
of all valid trials. Because Prompts 2 and 3 are nested within the off-task response of 
Prompt 1, the frequency of each attention state from these prompts was calculated as a 
proportion out of all valid off-task trials. The arcsine transformation (defined as sin-1√p 
where p is the proportion) was applied to all proportion values before running inferential 
statistics. For interpretability, all descriptive statistics and figures depict the raw values.   
Ex-Gaussian Behavioral Analysis. Reaction time data typically follow an ex-
Gaussian distribution. This analysis examined the extent to which RRT variability followed 
an ex-Gaussian distribution and whether the distribution parameters varied across attention 
states in the first prompt. Ex-Gaussian parameter estimation was performed using the 
timefit function with bootstrapping (1000 samples) in the R package retimes. This function 
performs parameter estimation for reaction time distributions using the maximum 
likelihood method. For each participant, raw RRT variance was modeled separately for 
each of the four attention states. Specifically, for each condition, the raw RRT variance 
was calculated for each trial and passed to the timefit function. Ex-Gaussian distribution 
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parameters (mu, sigma, and tau) were estimated for that condition. For each participant, 
one estimate was obtained for each parameter for each condition. From these estimates, a 
linear-mixed effects analysis was run at the group level to test whether these parameters 
(and hence, the ex-Gaussian distribution) differed across attention states.  
Preprocessing and Analysis of Pupillometric Data. Analysis was performed on 
epochs of the last 5 s of pupil data preceding the thought prompts along with the 2 – 4 s 
baseline period at the start of each tapping period. Epochs were excluded from analysis if 
missing pupillometry data was greater than 40% of the epoch (Smallwood et al., 2011). 
Missing data points in included epochs were linearly interpolated to create complete time 
series of pupil diameter measures. Then, epochs were filtered using a Hampel filter with a 
window-length of 7 (run in R with the package pracma). This function applied a moving 
window to each time series in order to detect local outliers via median absolute deviation. 
Values detected as outliers were replaced with the median of the moving window. 
Each epoch was baseline-corrected by dividing the time series by the median pupil 
diameter of the corresponding baseline epoch. The baseline-corrected epoch time series 
were then averaged to provide mean pupil diameter measures for each thought prompt. 
Therefore, values greater than one indicate an increase in pupil diameter relative to 
baseline, and values less than one indicate a decrease. (For interpretability, figures depict 
baseline at y = 0.) Mean pupil diameter was analyzed within each prompt.  
Preprocessing and Analysis of fMRI Data. Data preprocessing was performed 
using Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI). Standard preprocessing was 
conducted, including despiking, slice time correction, motion correction, spatial smoothing 
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(FWHM of 6.0 mm), structural-functional alignment, and normalization to MNI space. 
Individual analysis was conducted using AFNI. Group level analyses were conducted using 
AFNI and custom scripts in MATLAB. Individual and group analyses were conducted 
separately for each of the three prompts. 
Individual Analysis. Design matrices were created for each participant with 
covariates for each attention state. For Prompt 1, covariates of interest were on-task, TRI, 
off-task, and inattentive states. For Prompt 2, covariates of interest were external and 
internal states. For Prompt 3, covariates of interest were spontaneous and constrained 
states. For all analyses, covariates of no interest consisted of trials with no/incorrect 
responses, the probe period when participants reported their attention states, and the 
fixation period at the start of each tapping period. For each analysis, the last 5.2 seconds 
(corresponding to the last four taps) preceding the thought prompt were convolved with an 
idealized hemodynamic response function and modeled with a generalized linear model in 
AFNI.  
Whole-Brain Group Analysis. Data were analyzed at the group level with a linear 
mixed-effects model using the 3dLME function in AFNI. Like with the behavioral 
analyses, this model is an alternative to the traditional ANOVA but includes a random 
intercept and allows for missing data. The 3dLME function uses the coefficients modeled 
for each variable of interest in the individual analysis. Group-level general linear tests were 
run for the following contrasts from Prompt 1: on-task vs all distraction states; on-task vs 
TRI; on-task vs off-task; on-task vs inattentive; TRI vs off-task; TRI vs inattentive; and 
off-task vs inattentive. In addition, two conjunction analyses were run to further isolate 
neural activity pertaining to individual distraction states in Prompt 1. The first analysis 
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tested which voxels were significant in both the off-task and inattentive states compared to 
the on-task state (off-task > on-task ∩ inattentive > on-task). The second analysis tested 
which voxels were significant in the off-task state compared to both the inattentive and on-
task conditions (off-task > on-task ∩ off-task > inattentive). For Prompt 2, a general linear 
test was run for the contrast internal vs external. For Prompt 3, a general linear test was run 
for the contrast spontaneous vs constrained. A threshold of FDR corrected q = .05 was set 
for statistical analyses.  
Quadrant State Analysis. A separate individual and group analysis was conducted for 
the quadrant state analysis. Data were analyzed in the same manner as described for the 
three prompts. The trials from the upper and lower third of behavioral performance from 
on-task and off-task attention states were included in analysis. Design matrices were 
created for each participant with covariates for on-high, on-low, off-high, and off-low. 
Covariates of no interest were included for the other two attention states (task-related 
interference and inattention) along with the on-task and off-task trials not included in this 
analysis. In addition, covariates of no interest were created for trials with no/incorrect 
responses, the probe period when participants reported their attention states, and the 
fixation period at the start of each tapping period.  
The group-level analysis was performed using 3dLME. General linear tests were run 
for the following contrasts: on-low vs on-high; off-low vs off-high; on-low vs off-low; and 
on-high vs off-high. In addition, student t-tests were run to test the last two contrasts, on-
high vs off-low, and on-low vs off-high, as these could not be implemented with the 
3dLME syntax. A threshold of FDR corrected q = .05 was set for statistical analyses. 
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Previous research (Kucyi et al., 2016a) found independent contributions of attention 
state and behavioral performance to BOLD signal in the DMN. Therefore, to directly test 
for this effect in the current study, percent signal change was examined between each 
condition in the DMN. The DMN here was defined a priori based on the 7-network 
estimate parcellation from Yeo et al. (2011). A mask was then used to extract the average 
beta coefficients generated for each condition. At the group level, a 2x2 linear mixed effects 
model was run in R to test the effect of performance and attention with DMN percent signal 
change as the dependent variable. 
Functional Connectivity Analysis. A seed-based, beta-series functional connectivity 
analysis (Rissman, Gazzaley, & D'Esposito, 2004) was conducted to more closely examine 
the neural correlates of the dynamics of thought measured with Prompt 3. Individual GLM 
analyses were run for each participant following procedures described above, with the 
addition that the trials from the constrained and spontaneous attention states were modeled 
individually. Analysis was based on a set of ROIs comprising the DMN and FPCN taken 
from previous literature (Godwin et al. (2017) and Spreng et al. (2013)). There were 17 
nodes in the DMN and 15 nodes in the FPCN, and each node was a 5-mm spherical ROI. 
For each participant, the time series of individual beta estimates were averaged across the 
voxels for each node to create one average beta series per node per attention state. The left 
hippocampus and left dlPFC served as the seed regions for the DMN and FPCN, 
respectively. The hippocampus was selected due to its role within the DMN as a source of 
off-task thought content (Christoff et al., 2016); the left side was selected arbitrarily. The 
dlPFC was selected because of its prominent role in the FPCN (Christoff et al., 2016) and 
its vast implications in directed task processing in general. Again, the left side was selected 
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arbitrarily. Each seed region’s average beta series was then correlated with each node’s 
average beta series. For both the DMN and FPCN, the group mean fisher-transformed 
correlation coefficients from the spontaneous and constrained attention states were 
statistically tested 1) against zero (within-state analysis) 2) against each other (across-state 
analysis).  
A second functional connectivity analysis was conducted to examine large-scale 
network connectivity during spontaneous and constrained thought. Connectivity matrices 
were calculated from the mean beta series of each node. Following previously published 
procedures (Godwin et al., 2017), within-network functional connectivity was calculated 
for the DMN and FPCN by taking the triangular half of the correlation matrix of all nodes 
for each network. The average of these fisher-transformed correlation coefficients was used 
as the measure of within-network connectivity. Between-network functional connectivity 
was calculated by correlating all DMN nodes with all FPCN nodes and averaging the 
fisher-transformed correlation coefficients. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Self-Report Measures 
Prompt 1. The proportions of each reported attention state collapsed across blocks 
are shown in Figure 2. Overall, off-task thoughts were most frequent and inattentive states 
were least frequent. To test for significant differences between proportions, a linear mixed-
effects model was run with Prompt 1 as a factor and the four attention states from Prompt 
1 as the levels. There was a significant main effect of attention state, F(3,90) = 9.34, p < 
.001. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that there was a significantly smaller proportion of 
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inattentive states (M = .15, SEM = .02) compared to on-task (M = .25, SEM = .03; z = -
3.00, p = .014), TRI (M = .27, SEM = .02; z = -3.80, p < .001), and off-task (M = .32, SEM 
= .03; z = -5.20, p < .001). No other comparisons were significant, .79 < all zs < 2.20, all 
ps > .17. In general, participants reported that their attention state was typically focused on 
something, whether it was on the task, TRI, or off-task thoughts. These attention states 
were reported relatively equally and more frequently compared to the inattentive state. 
 
Figure 2 – Proportion of each attention state in Prompt 1. There was a main effect of 
attention state, and significantly fewer inattentive states reported compared to the 
other states. 
The proportions of each attention state by block are shown in Figure 3. Across blocks, 
the inattentive state was reported relatively less frequently than the other attention states. 
In addition, there was a small increase in frequency of the off-task state across the five 
blocks. To test for significant differences as a function of block, a 2x2 linear mixed-effects 
model was run with Prompt 1 and block as factors. However, there was no significant main 
effect of block, F(4, 570) = .098, p = .983, nor a significant interaction, F(12, 570) = 1.392, 
p = .165. As described above, there was a significant main effect across the attention states 
of Prompt 1, F(3, 570) = 29.168, p < .001. 
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Figure 3 – Proportion of each attention state in Prompt 1 by block. The proportions 
of each attention state were calculated from the number of all attention states per 
block. 
Prompt 2. The proportions of each attention state response collapsed across blocks 
are shown in Figure 4. Overall, more internal (M = .66, SEM = .03) than external (M = .34, 
SEM = .03) thoughts were reported. This comparison was significant, t(30) = -4.77, p < 
.001. 
 
Figure 4 – Proportion of external and internal attention states calculated out of all 
off-task thoughts. There were significantly more internal than external thoughts 
reported. 
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The proportions of internal and external attention states across blocks are shown in 
Figure 5. To test for significant differences between attention states in each block, paired 
t-tests were run on the proportions of reported internal and external attention states within 
each block for a total of five comparisons. Bonferroni correction was applied. There were 
on average more internal than external thoughts reported in Blocks 1 and 2, however the 
difference in proportions within the first two blocks did not quite reach significance (Block 
1: t(29) = -1.946, p = .061; Block 2: t(29) = -1.876, p = .071). However, the difference 
between proportions of internal and external thoughts within the last three blocks all 
reached significance after correcting for multiple comparisons, all |t|s > 3, all ps < .002. 
 
Figure 5 – Proportion of external and internal attention states by block. Proportions 
were calculated out of the total number of off-task thoughts in each block. Over the 
course of the last three blocks there were significantly more internal than external 
thoughts reported. 
Prompt 3. The proportions of each attention state collapsed across blocks are shown 
in Figure 6. Overall, more spontaneous (M = .61, SEM = .03) than constrained (M = .39, 




Figure 6 – Proportion of spontaneous and constrained attention states calculated out 
of all off-task thoughts. There were significantly more spontaneous than constrained 
thoughts reported. 
The proportions of spontaneous and constrained attention states across blocks are 
shown in Figure 7. As with Prompt 2, a set of paired t-tests was run to test for significant 
differences between these proportions within each block. There was a significant difference 
between the proportion of spontaneous and constrained thoughts in Block 1, t(28) = 2.855, 
p = .008, and Block 3, t(28) = 3.607, p = .001. The other blocks were not significant, 
however moderate trends appeared in each comparison, 1.68 < all ts < 2.01 and .051 < all 
ps < .103. Bonferroni correction for the five comparisons was applied. 
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Figure 7 – Proportion of spontaneous and constrained attention states by block. 
Proportions were calculated out of the total number of off-task thoughts in each 
block. There were significantly more spontaneous thoughts reported in Block 1 and 
Block 3, although a trend in the same direction was present across the other blocks. 
2.2.2 Behavioral Measures 
A linear mixed-effects model was run to examine the effect of block on overall RRT 
variance. There was a significant main effect of block, F(4, 120) = 7.01, p < .001 (Figure 
8). Results of post-hoc comparisons are summarized in Table 1. In general, RRT variance 
was lowest in the first block, increased during the next three blocks, and decreased during 
the final block. 
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Figure 8 – Mean RRT variance (natural log transformed) across blocks. There was a 
significant main effect across blocks. 
 
Table 1 – Post-hoc comparisons of mean RRT variance between each block.  
*: Significant after Tukey multiple comparison correction 
 
Prompt 1. A linear mixed-effects model was run with Prompt 1 as a factor and the 
four attention states from Prompt 1 as the levels. There was a significant main effect of 
attention state, F(3, 83) = 17.78, p < .0001 (Figure 9). Results of post-hoc comparisons are 
summarized in Table 2. RRT variance was significantly greater during each distraction 
state compared to being completely on-task. However, most distraction states did not differ 
significantly from each other in terms of performance variability.  
    
Pair   z p-value 
Block 1 - Block 2 4.642 < .001 * 
 - Block 3 3.470 .005 * 
 - Block 4 4.174 < .001 * 
 - Block 5 1.844 .348 
Block 2 - Block 3 -1.172 .767 
 - Block 4 -0.468 .990 
 - Block 5 -2.799 .041 * 
Block 3 - Block 4 0.704 .956 
 - Block 5 -1.627 .480 
Block 4 - Block 5 -2.331 .135 
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Figure 9 – Mean RRT variance for each attention state in Prompt 1. There was a 
significant main effect of attention state. 
 
Table 2 - Post-hoc comparisons of RRT variance between each attention state in 
Prompt 1. *: Significant after Tukey multiple comparison correction. 
    
Pair   z p-value 
on-task - TRI 2.749 .030 * 
 - off-task 4.900 <.001 * 
 - inattentive 7.084 <.001 * 
TRI - off-task 2.198 .124 
 - inattentive 4.585 <.001 * 
off-task - inattentive 2.511 .058 
 
Prompts 2 and 3. To examine the main effects and interactions between environment 
(external versus internal) and dynamics (spontaneous versus constrained) on performance 
variability, a 2x2 linear mixed effects model was run. However, there were no significant 
effects of environmental attention state, F(1, 62) = .389, p = .535, or dynamic attention 
state, F(1, 62) = .985, p = .325. In addition, there was no significant interaction between 
environmental and dynamic attention states, F(1, 62) = 2.495, p = .119. Results are shown 
in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 – Mean RRT variance (natural log transformed) for Prompts 2 and 3. There 
were no significant main effects or interaction. 
Ex-Gaussian Analysis. The ex-Gaussian analysis was run on the raw RRT values 
calculated from the last five taps of each trial. Figure 11 illustrates the results for all three 
parameters. There was no significant difference in mu values across attention states, F(3, 
81) = 1.00, p = .40. There was a marginal significant difference in sigma values across 
attention states, F(3, 81) = 2.66, p = .054. There was a significant difference in tau values 
across attention states, F(3, 81) = 7.75, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons for the tau 
parameter analysis are summarized in Table 3. The mean values of the parameters were 
used to generate probability distribution functions for each attention state. These 
distributions are shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 11 – Mean parameter estimates from the ex-Gaussian analysis of raw RRT 
variance in Prompt 1. Statistical analyses were run separately for each parameter. 
There was a significant main effect of attention state for the tau parameter. 
 
Table 3 - Post-hoc comparisons of the tau parameter between attention states of 
Prompt 1. *: Significant after Tukey multiple comparison correction.  
Pair   z p-value 
on-task - TRI 1.270 .582 
 - off-task 3.565 .002 * 
 - inattentive 4.285 <.001 * 
TRI - off-task 2.343 .088 
 - inattentive 3.177 .008 * 




Figure 12 – Distribution functions generated from the average ex-Gaussian 
parameters of each attention state. 
Quadrant State Analysis. Analysis focused on the on-task and off-task reports from 
Prompt 1. The top and bottom third trials were identified based on RRT variance and 
organized into the following four conditions: on-task + high variance (on-high), on-task + 
low variance (on-low), off-task + high variance (off-high), and off-task + low variance 
(off-low) (summarized in Figure 1). A linear mixed effects analysis was run to compare 
RRT variance across performance variability (high vs low) and attention state (on-task vs 
off-task). 
As expected, and by design, a significant main effect of performance was observed, 
indicating that RRT variance in the high variability condition was significantly greater than 
in the low variability condition, F(1, 80) = 807.91, p < .0001. In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of attention state, F(1, 80) = 21.114, p < .0001, where off-task 
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thoughts had greater mean RRT variance than on-task thoughts. The interaction between 
attention state and performance was not significant, F(1, 80) = .201, p = .655. 
To understand further the relationship between each attention state and performance 
level, post-hoc tests were conducted for all paired comparisons. This resulted in six paired 
comparison tests and Tukey correction was applied. All comparisons were significant, all 
zs > |3|, all ps < .013. Results are illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 – Quadrant State Analysis. Mean RRT variance calculated from the top 
and bottom third of on-task and off-task attention states. 
Overall, there were large significant differences between trials with the highest 
variance compared to the lowest variance, along with differences between on-task and off-
task trials. As hypothesized, the most extreme low-variance trials were reported on average 
as on-task, and the most extreme high-variance trials were reported on average as off-task.  
Interestingly, however, off-low trials were significantly more variable than on-low trials, 
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even though both were characterized by low variance. Furthermore, off-high trials were 
significantly more variable than on-high trials, even though both were characterized by 
high variance. Together, these contrasts suggest that over and above objective behavioral 
performance, an individual’s subjective attention state can provide additional information 
regarding attention and performance. These findings are further addressed in the 
Discussion. 
2.2.3 Pupillometry 
Prompt 1. There was no main effect of attention state, F(3, 60) = .16, p = .923. 
Because each epoch was baseline-corrected by dividing the time series by the median pupil 
diameter of the baseline, an epoch with a mean value of 1 would indicate no change from 
baseline. When tested against the baseline = 1, mean pupil diameters were significantly 
smaller than baseline for task-related thoughts t(23) = -3.704, p = .001 and off-task 
thoughts, t(22) = -4.840, p < .001. However, mean pupil diameter was not significantly 
different from baseline for on-task thoughts, t(21) = -1.787, p = .088 or the inattentive state, 
t(17) = -.912, p = .374. Results are illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 – Pupil diameter relative to baseline for Prompt 1. For visualization, 
baseline here is at y = 0. 
Prompt 2 and 3. To examine the effect that environment and dynamics had on pupil 
diameter, a 2x2 linear mixed effects model was run. This model indicated a significant 
main effect of dynamics, F(1, 41) = 7.278, p = .010, with smaller pupil diameter on average 
corresponding with spontaneous thoughts. Results also indicated a significant interaction 
between environment and dynamics, F(1, 41) = 4.175, p = .048. As shown in Figure 15, 
this interaction was driven by the internal attention state where internally directed 
spontaneous thoughts had smaller pupil diameters compared to internally directed 




Figure 15 – Pupil diameter relative to baseline for Prompts 2 and 3. For visualization, 
baseline here is at y = 0. There was a significant main effect of dynamics and a 
significant interaction, where pupil diameter for internal-spontaneous thoughts was 
smaller than internal-constrained thoughts. 
Prompt 2. To test for differences between baseline and mean pupil diameter in each 
environmental state, one-sample t-tests were run against the null hypothesis baseline = 1. 
Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparison correction. Pupil diameter was 
significantly smaller for the internal attention state, t(22) = -3.842, p < .001. Pupil diameter 
was also smaller for the external attention state, however this result did not reach 
significance, t(20) = -1.947, p = .066. 
Prompt 3. A separate set of one-sample t-tests were run to test for differences 
between baseline and mean pupil diameter in each dynamic state. Bonferroni correction 
was applied. Pupil diameter was significantly smaller for the spontaneous attention state 
when compared to baseline = 1, t(22) = -5.782, p < .001. There was no difference between 
pupil diameter for the constrained attention state and baseline, t(19) = -.341, p = .737. 
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2.2.4 fMRI Analysis 
Prompt 1: Whole Brain Analysis. A whole brain analysis was run in AFNI using a 
linear mixed effects model to examine BOLD response across the different attention states 
of Prompt 1. The first general linear test examined brain activity during the on-task state 
compared to all forms of distraction (task-related interference, off-task, and inattentive 
states). In general, significant activation in BOLD signal was observed during distraction 
states across the orbital frontal gyrus near the medial PFC and in the left inferior frontal 
gyrus. In addition, activation was observed in the right lingual gyrus, the left postcentral 
gyrus, and supplementary motor area during distraction states. No activation associated 
with on-task thoughts survived whole-brain correction. Significant clusters of activation 
associated with the distraction states are listed in Table 4. 
 
Figure 16 – Prompt 1. Contrast of on-task > off-task (FDR-corrected q = .05) 
A) Axial view. B) Left hemisphere, lateral sagittal view. C) Left hemisphere, medial 
sagittal view.  
 
A series of additional general linear tests were run to compare each pair of attention 
states. When contrasting off-task thoughts with on-task thoughts (Figure 16), there was 
significant activation in many DMN regions along with the left precentral and postcentral 
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gyrus. Significant activation for on-task thoughts was observed in the right inferior parietal 
lobule. When contrasting off-task thoughts to the inattentive state, there was activation 
observed in regions including the left middle frontal gyrus, left precuneus, left inferior 
parietal lobule, bilateral caudate nucleus, and bilateral cuneus (Figure 17). Activation was 
observed in the right inferior frontal gyrus for the inattentive state. Significant clusters of 
activation are listed in Table 4. There was no significant activity when contrasting on-task 
and TRI attention states.  
 
Figure 17 – Prompt 1. Contrast of off-task > inattentive (FDR-corrected q = .05) 
A) Axial view. B) Left hemisphere, lateral sagittal view. 
 
Two conjunction analyses were performed to examine further the patterns of neural 
activity pertaining to individual distraction states. The first analysis tested which voxels 
were significant in both the off-task and inattentive states compared to the on-task state 
(off-task > on-task ∩ inattention > on-task). Shared activity in both states was observed in 
the left inferior frontal gyrus and left ACC. Activity in the off-task state, which was not 
present in the inattentive state, was observed in a large set of DMN and MTL regions, 
including the precuneus, parahippocampal gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus. Activation in 
the insula was also observed. Activity in the inattentive state, which was not present in the 
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off-task state, was observed in subregions of both the ventral and dorsal ACC and left 
inferior frontal gyrus. To further isolate off-task activity, a second conjunction analysis 
was performed on the off-task state compared to both the inattentive and on-task conditions 
(off-task > on-task ∩ off-task > inattention). Activation associated with the off-task state 
in both contrasts was observed in the left middle frontal gyrus, left precuneus, right lingual 
gyrus, left superior medial gyrus, and right cerebellum. 
In general, as predicted and replicating much previous research, increased DMN 
activation was observed during off-task thoughts and distraction states in general. 
Increased activity during the distraction states, in particular the off-task and inattention 
states, was also observed in left motor areas, perhaps associated with increased behavior 
variability when attention oriented away from the task. In addition, activation in 
frontoparietal “task-positive” regions was observed in the off-task state compared to 
inattention, in line with the role these regions have in off-task thought such as planning and 
problem solving. 
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Table 4 - Regions with significant activation (FDR correction q = .05) for each contrast of the Prompt 1 whole brain analysis. 
The number of voxels pertains to the size of each cluster identified in AFNI. The peak of each cluster is indicated with MNI 
coordinates. The region is the anatomical region of the cluster peak identified with the CA_ML_18_MNIA atlas in AFNI. 
        
Contrast Number of Voxels x y z Hemisphere Region Condition 
on-task vs. all distraction states               
 220 -45 -24 63 left postcentral gyrus all distraction states 
 23 -42 24 21 left inferior frontal gyrus all distraction states 
 11 6 -87 -3 right lingual gyrus all distraction states 
 9 -12 51 -12 left middle orbital gyrus all distraction states 
 8 -18 -60 27 left cuneus all distraction states 
 6 -6 21 54 left SMA   all distraction states 
on-task vs. TRI               
  n/a n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a 
on-task vs. off-task           
 653 -33 -72 45 left inferior parietal lobule off-task 
 450 -45 -24 69 left postcentral gyrus off-task 
 299 -9 51 -12 left mid orbital gyrus off-task 
 193 -48 24 24 left inferior frontal gyrus off-task 
 142 -21 -24 -9 left hippocampus off-task 
 131 60 -30 54 right inferior parietal lobule on-task 
 127 -6 18 51 left SMA off-task 
 125 21 -87 -33 right cerebellum off-task 
 101 3 -87 0 right calcarine gyrus off-task 
 63 -30 -54 60 left superior parietal lobule off-task 
 59 -9 3 -3 left pallidum off-task 
 33 -18 63 15 left superior frontal gyrus off-task 
 30 -24 36 -15 left middle orbital gyrus off-task 
 27 21 -33 -39 right cerebellum off-task 
 19 -45 45 -3 left inferior frontal gyrus off-task 
 17 21 -51 -18 right cerebellum off-task 
 14 12 15 3 right caudate nucleus off-task 
 14 -51 18 48 left middle frontal gyrus off-task 
 13 -24 21 -9 left insula off-task 
 10 -36 33 0 left inferior frontal gyurs off-task 
 6 45 -69 -45 right cerebellum off-task 
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 6 39 -72 -36 right cerebellum off-task 
 6 -45 -90 6 left middle occipital on-task 
  5 54 -57 -27 right cerebellum off-task 
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Quadrant State Analysis. To examine brain activity across high and low 
performance variability and on-task and off-task attention states, a separate whole brain 
analysis was run with a linear mixed effects model. A set of six contrasts were run to 
compare brain activity across each combination of attention state and performance, as in 
the behavioral analysis: on-high, on-low, off-high, and off-low. 
No significant activity survived whole-brain correction in the following general 
linear contrasts: on-low versus on-high; off-low versus off-high, and on-low versus off-
low. In addition, there was no significant activity in the contrast on-high versus off-low.  
Whereas most whole-brain contrasts did not yield significant results, when 
comparing the off-high condition to the on-high condition, there was extensive activity in 
the off-high condition throughout the brain (Figure 18), perhaps due to the more extreme 
nature of being in an off-task, high performance variability state compared to on-task, 
regardless of the performance variability in the on-task state. Similar to the results of 
Prompt 1 described above, this activity was observed in areas belonging to the DMN, 
including the precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal 
lobule, and angular gyrus. In addition, activation was observed over the bilateral motor 
cortex as well as regions including the insula, superior parietal lobule, and occipital 
regions. When comparing activation in off-high to on-low, a similar but less extensive 
pattern of significant activity was observed. Activation during the off-high condition was 
observed in the precuneus and inferior parietal lobule, as well as the middle and superior 
frontal gyrus, superior parietal lobule, and motor cortex. 
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Figure 18 – Quadrant State Analysis. Contrast of on-high > off-high (FDR-corrected 
q = .05) A) Left hemisphere, lateral sagittal view. B) Axial view. C) Right hemisphere, 
medial sagittal view. D) Multislice axial view of on-high > off-high contrast. 
In the DMN percent signal change analysis, there was a significant main effect of 
attention state, F(1, 80) = 4.42, p = .039. There was a trending but nonsignificant interaction 
between attention state and performance variance, F(1, 80) = 2.83, p = .096. There was no 
main effect of performance variance, F(1,80) = .040, p = .843. Overall, there was decreased 
signal in the DMN during the on-task attention state compared to off-task, and the greatest 
difference in activation was observed between the off-high condition and the on-high 
condition. Results are summarized in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 – Quadrant State Analysis. DMN percent signal change as a function of 
attention state and performance variance. There was a main effect of attention state 
and a trending but nonsignificant interaction between attention state and 
performance. 
Prompt 2: Whole Brain Analysis. This contrast examined the effect of 
environmental orientation of attention state on brain activity. There was no significant 
activity associated with internally orientated attention states. Significant activity associated 
with externally oriented attention included right inferior parietal lobule and right insula, 
consistent with externally oriented attention and saliency processing. Significant activity 
in externally oriented attention was also observed in right Heschl’s gyrus, consistent with 
auditory processing. 
Prompt 3: Whole Brain Analysis. The contrast for Prompt 3 focused specifically 
on the dynamics of internally-directed thoughts. There were too few trials categorized as 
externally oriented to run a factorial analysis examining environment by dynamics. In 
addition, it was theoretically interesting to constrain the Prompt 3 analysis to internally-
directed thoughts, as this would provide insight to the dynamics of classically defined 
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“task-unrelated and stimulus independent” mind wandering instances (Christoff, 2012; 
Christoff et al., 2016). No significant activity was observed for spontaneous thoughts. 
However, for constrained thoughts, a significant cluster of activity was observed in the left 
hippocampal region (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20 – Prompt 3. Internal-constrained > Internal-spontaneous contrast (FDR 
corrected q = .05) 
Functional Connectivity Analysis. To examine further the neural correlates of the 
dynamics of thought, beta series functional connectivity analyses were run on Prompt 3, 
again focusing on internally-directed thought dynamics. Functional connectivity analysis 
within the DMN, with the left hippocampus serving as the seed region, showed no 
significant differences between constrained and spontaneous thoughts, all ps > .10 (Table 
5). When testing each set of correlations against the null hypothesis r = 0, there was 
significant connectivity between the left hippocampus and right hippocampus for 
spontaneous thoughts (M = .458, SEM = .13), t(14) = 3.59, p = .003 (Bonferroni corrected; 
Table 6). 
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Functional connectivity analysis within the FPCN, with the left dlPFC serving as the 
seed region, showed no significant differences between internal-constrained and internal-
spontaneous in any FPCN node pairs (Table 5). When testing each set of correlations 
against the null hypothesis r = 0, several significant correlations for spontaneous and 
constrained thoughts were observed following Bonferroni correction. These results are 
summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 5 - Functional connectivity between internal spontaneous and constrained thoughts for both the DMN (seed: left 
hippocampus) and the FPCN (seed: left dlPFC). Correlation values are fisher-transformed. No comparisons were significant. 
Abbreviations: prefrontal cortex (PFC); posterior cingulate cortex (PCC); anterior medial PFC (amPFC); dorsomedial PFC 
(dmPFC); angular gyrus (Ang); inferior frontal gyrus (IFG); superior frontal gyrus (SFG); superior temporal sulcus (STS); 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ); hippocampal formation (HF);  anterior temporal lobe (aTemp); ventromedial PFC (vmPFC); 
medial frontal gyrus (MFG) anterior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL); anterior insula (aIns); rostrolateral PFC (rlPFC); medial 
superior PFC (msPFC); dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) 
       
  Seed ROI Mean internal-spontaneous r (SEM) Mean internal-constrained r (SEM) t p-value 
DMN left hipp PCC .129 (.10) .452 (.19) -1.546 .144 
  amPFC .135 (.10) .355 (.19) -0.879 .394 
  dmPFC .081 (.11) .244 (.21) -0.604 .555 
  left Ang .278 (.10) .427 (.15) -0.708 .490 
  left IFG .149 (.11) .232 (.18) -0.341 .738 
  left SFG .037 (.12) .342 (.17) -1.719 .108 
  left STS .056 (.15) .184 (.15) -0.544 .595 
  left TPJ .048 (.12) .238 (.15) -0.865 .402 
  left aTemp .215 (.15) .177 (.20) 0.146 .886 
  right Ang .083 (.13) .513 (.29) -1.309 .212 
  right HF .458 (.13) .629 (.30) -0.518 .613 
  right IFG -.008 (.12) .235 (.13) -1.266 .226 
  right STS .195 (.08) .409 (.17) -1.009 .330 
  right TPJ .206 (.07) .025 (.19) 0.840 .415 
  right aTemp .093 (.09) .177 (.20) -0.350 .731 
    vmPFC .266 (.09) .265 (.20) 0.007 .994 
FPCN left dlPFC left MFG (BA6) .355 (.11) .813 (.23) -1.932 .074 
  left MFG (BA9) .803 (.09) .937 (.27) -0.550 .591 
  left aIPL .704 (.12) .550 (.22) 0.647 .528 
  left aIns .321 (.13) .094 (.20) 0.915 .376 
  left rlPFC .436 (.13) .618 (.28) -0.617 .547 
  msPFC .631 (.14) .821 (.18) -0.861 .404 
  right MFGBA6 .320 (.09) .579 (.26) -0.889 .389 
  right MFGBA9 .544 (.13) .511 (.20) 0.124 .903 
  right SFG .314 (.10) .309 (.22) 0.022 .983 
  right aIPL .469 (.15) .423 (.21) 0.144 .888 
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  right aIns .224 (.12) .448 (.19) -0.858 .405 
  right dACC .537 (.15) .835 (.23) -1.093 .292 
  right dlPFC .601 (.16) .657 (.19) -0.174 .864 
    right rlPFC .473 (.14) .792 (.25) -0.929 .369 
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Table 6 - Summary of functional connectivity of each ROI tested against the null hypothesis r = 0.  *: Significant after Bonferroni 
correction (family-wise correction within each network and attention state). During spontaneous thoughts, the right HF was 
significantly correlated with the DMN seed (left hippocampus). Within the FPCN, there was significant functional connectivity 
between several ROIs and the seed (left dlPFC) during spontaneous and constrained internal attention states. 
   internal-spontaneous   internal-constrained 
  Seed ROI Mean r (SEM) t p-value   Mean r (SEM) t p-value 
DMN left hipp PCC .129 (.10) 1.341 .201  .452 (.19) 2.364 .033 
  amPFC .135 (.10) 1.390 .186  .355 (.19) 1.841 .087 
  dmPFC .081 (.11) 0.763 .458  .244 (.21) 1.147 .271 
  left Ang .278 (.10) 2.779 .015  .427 (.15) 2.925 .011 
  left IFG .149 (.11) 1.395 .185  .232 (.18) 1.271 .224 
  left SFG .037 (.12) 0.317 .756  .342 (.17) 1.955 .071 
  left STS .056 (.15) 0.379 .711  .184 (.15) 1.242 .235 
  left TPJ .048 (.12) 0.403 .693  .238 (.15) 1.595 .133 
  left aTemp .215 (.15) 1.393 .185  .177 (.20) 0.866 .401 
  right Ang .083 (.13) 0.630 .539  .513 (.29) 1.793 .095 
  right HF .458 (.13) 3.595 .003 *  .629 (.30) 2.074 .057 
  right IFG -.008 (.12) -.063 .950  .235 (.13) 1.744 .103 
  right STS .195 (.08) 2.349 .034  .409 (.17) 2.428 .029 
  right TPJ .206 (.07) 2.998 .010  .025 (.19) 0.131 .897 
  right aTemp .093 (.09) 1.000 .334  .177 (.20) 0.872 .398 
 
 vmPFC .266 (.09) 3.075 .008  .265 (.20)  1.330 .205 
FPCN left dlPFC left MFG (BA6) .355 (.11) 3.353 .005   .813 (.23) 3.489 .004 
  left MFG (BA9) .803 (.09) 9.375 < .001 *  .937 (.27) 3.532 .003 * 
  left aIPL .704 (.12) 5.646 < .001 *  .550 (.22) 2.447 .028 
  left aIns .321 (.13) 2.454 .028  .094 (.20) 0.463 .650 
  left rPFC .436 (.13) 3.468 .004  .618 (.28) 2.210 .044 
  msPFC .631 (.14) 4.441 .001 *  .821 (.18) 4.447 .001 * 
  right MFGBA6 .320 (.09) 3.480 .004  .579 (.26) 2.232 .043 
  right MFGBA9 .544 (.13) 4.355 .001 *  .511 (.20) 2.517 .025 
  right SFG .314 (.10) 3.211 .006  .309 (.22) 1.373 .192 
  right aIPL .469 (.15) 3.026 .009  .423 (.21) 2.050 .060 
  right aIns .224 (.12) 1.897 .079  .448 (.19) 2.371 .033 
  right dACC .537 (.15) 3.655 .003 *  .835 (.23) 3.683 .002 * 
  right dlPFC .601 (.16) 3.849 .002 *  .657 (.19) 3.379 .004 
    right rPFC .473 (.14) 3.428 .004   .792 (.25) 3.166 .007 
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To examine more broadly the roles of the DMN and FPCN in thought dynamics, 
network functional connectivity was examined. There was a trending but nonsignificant 
difference in DMN connectivity between constrained (M = .624, SEM = .136) and 
spontaneous thoughts (M = .336, SEM = .025), t(14) = 2.123, p = .052. However, there was 
no significant difference in FPCN connectivity between constrained (M = .620, SEM = 
.142) and spontaneous thoughts (M = .457, SEM = .053), t(14) = 1.066, p = .304. When 
examining connectivity between the DMN and FPCN, there was increased between-
network connectivity during constrained thoughts (M = .514, SEM = .143) compared to 
spontaneous thoughts (M = .262, SEM = .035). However, this difference did not reach 
significance, t(14) = 1.766, p = .099.  
There was no significant difference in within-network connectivity in the DMN (M 
= .624, SEM = .136) and within-network connectivity in the FPCN (M = .620, SEM = .142) 
during internal-constrained thoughts, t(14) = .033, p = .974. However, there was a 
significant difference between connectivity in the DMN (M = .336, SEM = .025) and the 
FPCN (M = .457, SEM = .053) during internal-spontaneous thoughts, t(14) = -3.304, p = 
.005. 
2.3 Summary and Discussion 
The MRT procedure coupled with an extensive set of thought probes provided a way 
to examine the relationship between attention states and performance variability. In 
addition, incorporating fMRI and pupillometry measures provided a way to investigate 
further the mechanisms of off-task thought and other attention states. Importantly, the 
results replicated previous research that had found increased RRT variability during off-
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task compared to on-task thought (Seli et al., 2013). More interesting, however, was the 
pattern of RRT variability across the attention state categories of Prompt 1. RRT variability 
increased linearly from the on-task attention state to the inattentive attention state (Figure 
9). Although the attention states were defined categorically, one possible interpretation of 
these findings is that the RRT variability pattern reflects a process of disengagement across 
the attention states. Understanding mind wandering and attention lapses from a perspective 
of disengagement has been proposed previously. For example, Cheyne and colleagues 
(2009) described mind wandering in terms of disengagement over the course of distinct 
states, where an individual can range from being in a state of transient disengagement to 
full “decoupling” from the task, where errors are most extreme. To investigate more in 
depth the relationship between behavioral performance and attention states, an ex-Gaussian 
analysis was conducted on the raw RRT variability values. It should be noted that the 
results of the ex-Gaussian analysis should be interpreted conservatively as pilot data, given 
the limited number of trials used compared to the typical requirements of ex-Gaussian 
analyses (Heathcote et al., 1991). The ex-Gaussian analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of attention state for the tau parameter, where the off-task and inattentive states were 
significantly greater than the on-task attention state. In general, these results indicate that 
the distributions of RRT variability for the more distracted states (i.e., off-task and 
inattentive) are significantly more skewed and reflect the fact that not only is performance 
variability increased on average, but that the variance of RRT variability is greater. These 
results suggest that during these more distracted states, the underlying mechanisms may be 
characterized by increased volatility and unpredictability. These results are discussed 
further in the Discussion.  
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A quadrant state analysis was conducted to examine both the behavioral and neural 
characteristics of on-task and off-task thoughts across periods of low and high performance 
variability. By design, there was a significant main effect of performance variability. In 
addition, there was a significant main effect of attention state and all pairwise comparisons 
were significant (Figure 13). In particular, within low performance variability, there was a 
small but significant difference between on-task and off-task. Similarly, within high 
performance variability, there was a small but significant difference between on-task and 
off-task. These results indicate that while these differences are small, self-reported 
attention states provide additional, important information beyond that provided by 
performance variability. The implications of these behavioral results are addressed further 
in the Discussion. Despite the behavioral dissociation, there were fewer significant results 
in the fMRI quadrant state analysis. Overall, a large amount of significant activity was 
observed in the contrast of off-high compared to on-high. This activity was observed across 
the DMN as well as the bilateral motor cortex, insula, superior parietal lobule, and occipital 
regions. A similar, yet attenuated, pattern of significant activity was observed in the 
contrast of off-high compared to on-low. These results reflect the involvement of a number 
of brain regions that have been associated previously with off-task thought (Fox et al., 
2015). The lack of a pattern of neural findings similar to that of the behavioral dissociation 
may be due to the underpowered nature of the design. The top and bottom third of trials 
were used from each attention state per participant. This may have resulted in too few trials 
in the fMRI analysis to detect at the whole brain level the subtle differences across task 
conditions that were observed with RRT variability. To focus specifically on the DMN, an 
ROI-based percent signal change analysis was conducted by extracting the average beta 
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weights (coefficients) from the DMN. The overall results indicated a main effect of 
increased DMN activity during the off-task compared to the on-task attention state, thus 
further replicating numerous previous studies. However, while the interaction did not reach 
significance, the overall pattern of results (shown in Figure 19) suggests there is an 
indication that a moderate amount of DMN activity is associated with low variability 
performance, regardless of the subjective attention state, a finding that is in line with those 
of Esterman et al. (2012).  
In addition, the neural correlates were investigated for each of the attention states of 
the three prompts. Overall, the fMRI results of Prompt 1 indicated increased DMN activity 
during the off-task compared to the on-task state, again replicating many previous findings. 
Furthermore, conjunction analyses revealed activity in frontoparietal regions unique to the 
off-task state, supporting the research that suggests these regions are recruited to drive off-
task thought processing along with the DMN. In addition, a large amount of activity was 
observed in the left motor regions, likely reflecting the increased performance variability 
associated with these conditions.  
Separate whole brain analyses were conducted for Prompts 2 and 3. In Prompt 2, an 
increase in fMRI activity was observed for external compared to internal attention states 
within the right inferior parietal lobule and right insula, consistent with externally oriented 
attention and saliency processing. Significant activity in externally oriented attention was 
also observed in right Heschl’s gyrus, consistent with auditory processing. For Prompt 3, 
analyses concentrated on just the internal constrained and spontaneous attention states, due 
to the limited number of external attention states. In addition, focusing analyses on just the 
internal constrained and spontaneous states was theoretically meaningful and allowed for 
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analyzing what have often been referred to as “stimulus-independent, task-unrelated 
thoughts” (Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Here, both whole brain and functional connectivity 
analyses were conducted. The whole brain analysis revealed a small amount of significant 
activation for constrained compared to spontaneous thoughts within the left hippocampal 
region. Most interesting, however, were the functional connectivity results. Functional 
connectivity calculated between all pairs of ROIs comprising the DMN and FPCN 
indicated overall increased functional connectivity during constrained compared to 
spontaneous attention states. In addition, there was a significant decrease in connectivity 
within the DMN for spontaneous compared to constrained thoughts. This decrease within 
the DMN for spontaneous thoughts may support the inherent variability and unconstrained 
nature that characterizes this attention state. The implications of these results and their 
potential mechanisms are discussed further in the Discussion. 
Last, in regard to pupillometry, there were no differences in pupil diameter across the 
attention states of Prompt 1. This was rather surprising given the previous findings that 
have documented differences in pupil diameter between on-task and off-task thought (e.g., 
Franklin et al., 2013). This lack of difference may be due to technical aspects of the 
experimental setting. For example, pupil diameter fluctuates due to changes in lighting 
(Sirois & Brisson, 2014). Although participants were instructed to remain focused on the 
fixation cross in the middle of the screen, they were likely engaged in a variety of looking 
patterns across the screen and towards other parts of the MRI scanner. This could result in 
a large number of changes in pupil diameter that are irrelevant to attention states (Sirois & 
Brisson, 2014). In addition, from a theoretical perspective, it is possible that differences 
failed to emerge due to motivation and arousal. Changes in pupil diameter reflect 
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fluctuations in arousal levels (Lenartowicz et al., 2013). Often, these fluctuations in arousal 
levels correspond to the current attention state of an individual (Lenartowicz et al., 2013). 
However, if arousal does not change across attention states, despite the subjective 
differences between each attention state, then pupil diameter will not effectively index 
distraction. While there were no differences in pupil diameter across the attention states of 
Prompt 1 (and thus, possibly no changes in arousal levels), when breaking down off-task 
thought into its environmental orientation and dynamics, there were significant differences 
in pupil diameter. There was a significant interaction between Prompt 2 and Prompt 3, 
where pupil diameter for internal, spontaneous thoughts was decreased compared to 
internal, constrained thoughts. More specifically, average pupil diameter for internal, 
constrained thoughts was comparable to baseline, and average pupil diameter for internal, 
spontaneous thoughts was decreased relative to baseline. It is possible that focused, 
constrained thoughts, and the corresponding arousal level, are similar to the attention state 
one is in during the baseline period, where the individual is re-focused on the task and 
preparing to begin a new tapping period. However, spontaneous thoughts may reflect not 
just a decoupling from a directed, focused attention state but also changes in arousal level 
as one lapses into freely moving off-task thought. It is possible that these differences in 
arousal can then be indexed with pupil diameter, as suggested with the current data. While 
pupil diameter on average did not change across the broad attention state of Prompt 1, when 
taking a more nuanced approach to off-task thought via Prompt 2 and Prompt 3, subtle but 




CHAPTER 3. STUDY 2 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
A total of 33 participants were recruited from the Georgia Institute of Technology. 
The age of participants ranged from 18 to 25 (M = 20, SD = 1.8). All participants were 
right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, and reported no 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. The data from one participant was excluded due to 
technical issues, leaving data from a total of 32 participants for analysis. 
3.1.2 Metronome Response Task (Two-Tone Version) 
This version of the MRT consisted of two conditions in which cognitive demand was 
manipulated across blocks: the easy condition (low cognitive demand), which consisted of 
the one-tone task, and the difficult condition (high cognitive demand), which consisted of 
the two-tone task. The easy condition was identical to the task in Study 1, in which 
participants tapped synchronously to a 450-Hz metronome tone using their right index 
finger. The difficult task consisted of a low-pitch tone (550 Hz) and a high-pitch tone (750 
Hz). Participants were taught two tapping patterns that corresponded to these two tones. 
Both tapping patterns consisted of sequences using all four fingers of the right hand. The 
low-pitch tapping pattern followed the order of ‘ring-index-middle-little’, where 
participants tapped their fingers in the order of ring finger, index finger, middle finger, 
little finger. The high-pitch tapping pattern followed the order of ‘little-middle-ring-index’, 
where participants tapped their fingers in the order of little finger, middle finger, ring 
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finger, index finger. During the tapping periods, the two tones alternated back and forth at 
variable frequencies, and a change in pitch indicated to participants which tapping 
sequence to perform. The tapping sequence was always performed synchronously with the 
metronome, regardless of the pitch. For example, during a particular tapping period 
consisting of 24 metronome beeps, the first nine beeps may be at the 550-Hz pitch, the next 
seven beeps may be at the 750-Hz pitch, and the final eight beeps may be at the 550-Hz 
pitch. In this case, participants would use the low-pitch sequence to tap along to the first 
nine beeps. Upon hearing the tone change, participants would switch to the high-pitch 
sequence for those seven beeps, and then switch back to the low-pitch sequence for the 
final eight beeps. For both task conditions and all tapping patterns, the metronome always 
sounded for 75 ms at a rate of 1300 ms per tone. 
3.1.3 Thought Probes 
The thought probes were identical to those in Study 1. Participants were presented 
with a thought prompt at the end of each tap period that asked them to classify the thought 
they had just prior to the onset of the probe. The thought prompt was presented for 6 s. If 
participants selected the “off-task” option, they then responded to the two additional 
thought probes, presented for 5 s each. Otherwise, a fixation remained on the screen for 10 
s until the next tapping period began. As in Study 1, participants were given detailed 
explanations of the thought prompts before beginning the experiment (Appendix A). 
3.1.4 Experimental Procedure 
The MRT was run using E-Prime software. All visual stimuli were presented in white 
font on a black background. At the start of the study, a sound and pitch test was performed 
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for each participant to ensure that the sound was at a suitable volume and to confirm 
whether participants were able to detect the differences between the two pitches used in 
the high cognitive load condition. Participants listened to the two pitches and verbally 
confirmed whether they detected a difference. All participants reported clearly detecting 
the two tones. 
The experiment consisted of eight blocks of tapping periods. There were four blocks 
of the easy condition and four blocks of the difficult condition, presented pseudo-randomly 
such that the first four blocks and the second four blocks each consisted of two easy 
conditions and two difficult conditions. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes open 
and focus on a fixation in the center of the screen. At the start of each block, participants 
were informed whether they would perform the one-tone task or the two-tone task.  Then 
a baseline fixation was presented in the center of the screen for a variable duration of 2 – 
4 s. The metronome began after the baseline. Participants were instructed to begin tapping 
at the start of the metronome and to tap as synchronously as possible using the appropriate 
tapping sequence(s) for the duration of the tapping period. All blocks consisted of 15 
tapping periods with variable durations between 16 and 36 s. These durations followed the 
same distribution as in Study 1. In the difficult condition, the tapping sequence switched 
pseudo-randomly. Because analyses focused on performance of the five taps preceding the 
thought prompts, the tapping sequences never switched during the last five beeps of a 
tapping period. This allowed for analysis of attention state and performance variability 
without any confounds associated with the act of switching between tap sequences. After 
the completion of each tapping period, participants were presented with the same sequence 
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of thought probes as in Study 1. Following the experiment, participants completed a 
questionnaire regarding their experience during the study. 
A training and practice session were performed at the start of the study to familiarize 
participants with the task and the tapping sequences. The training session consisted of 
practicing the three tapping sequences until they could perform them with minimal errors. 
After the training session, participants performed a practice experiment session where they 
practiced two short blocks of each task condition and responded to the thought prompts. 
3.1.5 Statistical Analysis 
Before statistical analysis, performance accuracy was calculated for each tapping 
period. In all conditions, all missing and incorrect taps were counted as errors. For the 
difficult condition, it was possible that participants made mistakes in the tapping sequences 
throughout the duration of the tapping period. Therefore, accuracy was determined based 
on comparing the performed 5-tap sequence preceding the prompt with the assigned 
tapping pattern, starting with the first of the last five taps. In the event that the first tap was 
missing, the sequences were compared starting with the second performed tap. To be 
included in analysis, each trial needed to have at least three correctly performed taps out of 
the five total. With these exclusion criteria, an average of 6% (SEM = 1.21%) of trials were 
removed from each participant’s data. This included an average of 3% (SEM = .80%) of 
trials from the easy condition and 10% (SEM = 1.90%) of trials from the difficult condition. 
As in Study 1, the RRT variance was calculated from the last five taps of each tapping 
period and was then transformed using the natural log transform. For statistical analysis of 
RRT variance as a function of condition and attention state, linear mixed-effects models 
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were run using the lme function from the nlme package in R. In all statistical analyses of 
RRT variance, only cells consisting of two or more reports were included in analysis. 
The frequency of each attention state in Prompt 1 was calculated within task level as 
a proportion out of all valid trials in each task level. Because Prompts 2 and 3 are nested 
within the off-task response of Prompt 1, the frequency of each attention state from these 
prompts was calculated as a proportion out of all valid off-task trials in each task level. The 
arcsine transformation (defined as sin-1√p where p is the proportion) was applied to all 
proportion values before running inferential statistics. For interpretability, all descriptive 
statistics and figures depict the raw values. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Self-Report Measures 
Prompt 1. The proportions of each attention state response were calculated within 
task level and are shown in Figure 21. To test for significant differences, a 2x2 linear 
mixed-effects model was run with Prompt 1 and task level as factors. There was a main 
effect of Prompt 1, F(3, 217) = 11.828, p < .001 and a significant interaction between 
Prompt 1 and task level, F(3, 217) = 6.512, p = .0003. The main effect of task level was 
not significant, F(3, 217) = .354, p = .553. A series of paired comparisons was run to test 
for significant differences in proportions within each task level as well as between 
corresponding attention states across task levels. Bonferroni correction was applied. 
Results are summarized in Table 7. 
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Figure 21 - Study 2, Prompt 1. Proportions of each attention state calculated within 
task level. There was a significant main effect of Prompt 1 and a significant 
interaction between Prompt 1 and task level. 
Table 7 - Pairwise comparisons between proportions of the Prompt 1 attention states 
within each task level (Easy level and Difficult level) and between each task level.  
*: Significant after Bonferroni correction 
     
  Pair    t-value p-value 
EASY LEVEL         
 on-task - TRI -1.038 .307 
  - off-task 0.996 .327 
  - inattentive -1.622 .115 
 TRI - off-task 2.588 .015 
  - inattentive -1.028 .312 
  off-task - inattentive -3.319 .002 * 
DIFFICULT LEVEL         
 on-task - TRI -1.813 .08 
  - off-task -3.597 .001 * 
  - inattentive -5.809 < .001 * 
 TRI - off-task -2.817 .008 
  - inattentive -5.145 <.001 * 
 off-task - inattentive -2.809 .008 
BETWEEN LEVELS         
 on-task easy - on-task difficult -3.264 .003 * 
 TRI easy - TRI difficult -3.205 .003 * 
 off-task easy - off-task difficult 4.183 < .001 * 
  inattentive easy - inattentive difficult 0.886 .383 
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Prompt 2. The proportions of external and internal thoughts were calculated within 
task level out of the number of off-task thoughts. Paired t-tests were run for each 
comparison and Bonferroni correction was applied. In both task levels, there was a greater 
proportion of internal thoughts compared to external thoughts (Figure 22), both ts > 2.88, 
ps < .008. There was no significant difference between the proportion of external thoughts 
in the easy condition compared to the difficult condition, t(31) = .957, p = .346, and as 
consequence2 there was no significant difference between the proportion of internal 
thoughts in the easy condition compared to the difficult condition. In addition, there was a 
significant difference when comparing external and internal proportions across task levels 
(i.e., external-easy vs internal-difficult and internal-easy vs external-difficult)2, t(31) = 
4.71, p < .001. 
 
Figure 22 – Study 2, Prompt 2. Proportions of external and internal thoughts (out of 
total off-task thoughts) calculated within task level. Overall, there was a significantly 
greater proportion of internal thoughts compared to external thoughts. 
                                                 
2 Note that because Prompt 2 is a binary condition and the proportions were calculated 
out of the number of off-task thoughts in each task level, the statistical tests here are 
comparable for both external and internal attention states when comparing across task 
levels (e.g., if the proportion of internal thoughts is .66, then the proportion of external 
thoughts must be .34). 
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Prompt 3. The proportions of spontaneous and constrained thoughts were calculated 
within task level out of the number of off-task thoughts (Figure 23). Paired t-tests were run 
for each comparison for a total of six comparisons. On average, there was a greater 
proportion of spontaneous thoughts in the difficult condition compared to the easy 
condition, however this did not reach significance, t(31) = -1.74, p = .091. (Note, however, 
that the overall number of reported off-task thoughts was lower in the difficult level; Figure 
21). In addition, there was a greater proportion of constrained thoughts in the easy 
condition compared to the difficult condition, but as with the previous comparison3, this 
was not significant, t(31) = 1.74, p = .091. There was a significant difference between the 
proportion of spontaneous and constrained thoughts within the difficult condition, t(31) = 
2.19, p = .036, however, this did not survive Bonferroni multiple comparison correction. 
No other comparisons were statistically significant. 
                                                 
3 Note that because Prompt 3 is a binary condition and the proportions were calculated 
out of the number of off-task thoughts in each task level, the statistical tests here are 
comparable for both spontaneous and constrained attention states when comparing across 
task levels (e.g., if the proportion of spontaneous thoughts is .53, then the proportion of 
constrained thoughts must be .47). 
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Figure 23 – Study 2, Prompt 3. Proportions of spontaneous and constrained thoughts 
(out of total off-task thoughts) calculated within task level. No comparisons survived 
multiple comparison correction. Without correction, there was a significantly greater 
proportion of spontaneous compared to constrained thoughts in the difficult 
condition. 
3.2.2 Behavioral Data 
Prompt 1. There was a significant main effect of attention state, F(3, 192) = 3.329, 
p = .021. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey correction indicated that RRT variance was 
significantly greater for the inattentive attention state compared to on-task thoughts, z = 
3.01, p = .014, and was marginally significantly greater compared to TRI thoughts, z = 
2.476, p = .064. No other comparisons were significant, all zs < 2.40, all ps > .100. There 
was no significant main effect of task level, F(1, 192) = 2.005, p = .158, and there was no 
significant interaction between attention state and task level, F(1, 192) = .895, p = .445. 
Results are shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24 – Study 2, Prompt 1. Transformed RRT variance. There was a significant 
main effect of attention state, where RRT variance was greater for the inattentive 
state compared to on-task thoughts. 
Prompt 2. There was a significant main effect of task level, F(1, 65) = 4.326, p = 
.0415, indicating that RRT variance increased overall during the difficult task level. The 
main effect of environment was not significant, F(1, 65) = 2.245, p = .139, and the 
interaction between task level and environment was not significant, F(1, 65) = 1.926, p = 
.170. Results are shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 – Study 2, Prompt 2. Transformed RRT variance. Overall, RRT variance 
was significantly increased during the difficult task level. 
Prompt 3. There were no significant main effects for task level, F(1, 69) = 1.346, p 
= .250, or for attention state, F(1, 69) = 1.593, p = .211. However, there was a significant 
interaction between task level and attention state, F(1, 69) = 5.720, p = .020. Post-hoc 
comparisons using Tukey correction indicated that within the easy task level, mean RRT 
variance was significantly greater for spontaneous thoughts than constrained thoughts, z = 
2.623, p = .044. In addition, for constrained thoughts, mean RRT variance was marginally 
significantly greater in the difficult task condition than the easy task condition, z = 2.536, 
p = .054. No other post-hoc comparisons were significant (all ps > .299). Results are shown 
in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 – Study 2, Prompt 3. Transformed RRT variance. There was a significant 
interaction between attention state and task level. Within the easy task level, RRT 
variance was significantly greater for spontaneous than constrained thoughts. 
3.3 Summary and Discussion 
The difficulty manipulation in Study 2 provided a way to examine performance 
variability and frequency of attention states as a function of cognitive load. Although 
performance variability did not differ significantly across the easy and difficult levels when 
examining the attention states of Prompt 1, overall performance accuracy of the tapping 
patterns was significantly different between the two task levels. In addition, participants 
reported that the difficult level was indeed more challenging subjectively compared to the 
easy level. This suggests that the cognitive load manipulation worked and that the difficult 
level was harder than the easy level.  
As predicted, there was a greater proportion of off-task thoughts reported in the easy 
level compared to the difficult level. Conversely, as predicted, there was a greater 
proportion of on-task thoughts reported in the difficult level compared to the easy level. 
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However, there was no significant main effect of task level for RRT variability, indicating 
that performance variability was comparable between both the easy and difficult task 
levels. In addition, within the easy level, the pattern of monotonically increasing RRT 
variability observed in Study 1 did not replicate, despite the equivalence between the easy 
level of Study 2 and the task in Study 1. It is possible this result did not replicate due to a 
lack of power, as there were only four blocks, and thus a fewer number of trials, in the easy 
level of Study 2. However, it is also important to consider the context in which this task 
was performed. Study 2 consisted of both easy and difficult levels presented pseudo-
randomly across eight blocks. The task overall was quite repetitive and unexciting. In 
particular, the easy level was very repetitive and required an increased amount of vigilance 
to maintain complete focus, whereas the difficult level was much more challenging. Some 
recent research has suggested that interspersing a boring task requiring vigilance with a 
more challenging task can provide the individual with a “break” that can increase arousal 
and improve performance on easy, vigilance-demanding tasks (Esterman & Rothlein, 
2019). That may be similar to what occurred in this study. These ideas are further expanded 
upon in the Discussion. 
There was a significant interaction in RRT variance between task level and thought 
dynamics. Within the easy task level, RRT variance was significantly greater for 
spontaneous thoughts compared to constrained thoughts. In addition, there was a relatively 
equal proportion of spontaneous and constrained thoughts reported within the easy task 
level. Furthermore, there were relatively more spontaneous thoughts compared to 
constrained thoughts reported in the difficult level, however this comparison did not reach 
significance after multiple comparison correction. In general, these patterns of attention 
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state frequency and performance variability across task levels speak to the ideas proposed 
in the context regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). These patterns 
indicate that when cognitive load is increased, as in the difficult level, the tendency to 
experience constrained, off-task thoughts decreases, perhaps due to the need for executive 
control mechanisms to guide task performance rather than engage in off-task thought. 
When attention lapses during the difficult level, it may be the result of a failure in executive 
control measures, and thus spontaneous off-task thoughts are more frequently experienced. 
Although previous research has suggested that within low cognitive load tasks, strong 
performance can be maintained in the face of attention lapses (e.g., Levison et al., 2012), 
the RRT variance data here suggest that performance quality may actually be a function of 
the dynamics of the off-task thoughts of the individual. RRT variance was low in the easy 
condition particularly when the individual experienced constrained off-task thoughts. 
However, RRT variance increased and was comparable to that in the difficult condition 
when the individual experienced spontaneous off-task thoughts. The implications of these 




CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
The overarching goal of this work was to elucidate the behavioral characteristics and 
neural mechanisms of a broad range of attention states and their dynamics. Specifically, I 
aimed 1) to provide a clearer understanding of off-task thoughts and their dynamics relative 
to on-task thought and other forms of attention lapses; 2) to test the extent that performance 
and self-reported attention state are dissociable; and 3) to examine the effect of cognitive 
load on performance and attention state. To achieve this, I ran two studies and incorporated 
a multimodal set of cognitive neuroscience methods including behavioral performance, 
functional neuroimaging, pupillometry, and self-report measures. In Study 1, unique 
behavioral and neural correlates were observed across different attention states, and 
performance and attention state were dissociated. In addition, fMRI activation and 
functional connectivity differentiated spontaneous and constrained attention states and, as 
discussed below, provided the first empirical evidence of the dynamics of attention states 
proposed in the framework of Christoff et al. (2016). In Study 2, performance varied 
systematically between thought dynamics as cognitive load increased, further supporting 
the framework proposed by Christoff et al. (2016) and the context regulation hypothesis 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Furthermore, across the results, a set of patterns 
emerged that speaks to a different perspective on mind wandering regarding task 
disengagement.  
4.1 Behavioral Performance and Attention States 
It is important that, in Study 1, results from Prompt 1 replicated those of Seli and 
colleagues (2013): RRT variance was significantly smaller during the on-task attention 
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state compared to the off-task state, indicating that overall, performance decreased during 
the off-task state compared to on-task. Across all distraction prompts (TRI, off-task, and 
inattention), RRT variability increased compared to on-task, confirming that each of these 
attention states is a form of distraction when defined both subjectively and behaviorally. 
Overall, participants reported fewer instances of being in an inattentive state compared to 
on-task and the other forms of distraction, indicating that most of the time, participants 
were at least paying attention to something if not the task itself. In addition, the frequency 
of off-task thoughts was relatively steady across blocks, and frequencies were similar to 
those reported elsewhere (e.g., Unsworth & Robison, 2016).  
Performance also differed between other pairs of distraction states, in particular the 
inattentive state. RRT variance was greater in this state compared to the TRI state. 
Similarly, RRT variance in the inattentive state was greater than in the off-task state; 
however, this effect did not reach significance . These findings provide support for the 
hypothesis that different forms of distraction have different effects on performance, 
perhaps as a function of task disengagement (discussed below). These findings also align 
with previous research that has documented similar relative decreases in performance 
during inattentive states (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). At the same time, these results 
indicate that other forms of distraction have similar consequences in terms of performance. 
Specifically, there was no difference in RRT variance between off-task and TRI thoughts. 
This result suggests that even when one is indirectly focused on the task (i.e., by thinking 
about topics related to the task), these thought processes can be similarly detrimental to 
performance. 
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More broadly speaking, RRT variance followed a nearly monotonic increase from 
on-task to inattentive. Although the attention states of Prompt 1 were defined categorically, 
the overall pattern is consistent with the concept of varying disengagement during task 
performance. For example, Cheyne et al. (2009) described mind wandering in terms of 
disengagement over the course of distinct states. These distinct states ranged from transient 
disengagement from a task where the individual can typically re-focus effectively and 
avoid overt errors, to full “decoupling” from the task where serious behavioral errors can 
occur. Another group of researchers (Schad, Nuthmann, & Engbert, 2012) proposed a 
levels of inattention hypothesis, which predicts that reductions in attention and other 
cognitive processes can occur at different hierarchical levels (e.g., early perceptual versus 
higher-order abstract processing). The attention state categories from Prompt 1 may have 
captured similar levels of disengagement ranging from full engagement (on-task) to severe 
decoupling (inattention).  
To investigate more deeply the behavioral characteristics of attention, a second 
analysis was run on the raw RRT data where the ex-Gaussian parameters of each attention 
state in Prompt 1 were estimated. Here, tau was significantly greater for off-task and 
inattentive states compared to on-task and TRI states. In addition, sigma also varied 
between attention states, although the main effect did not quite reach significance. As 
illustrated in Figure 12, the distributions of the off-task and inattentive states are more 
positively skewed and characterized by heavier tails compared to the on-task and TRI 
states. In general, a greater proportion of these trials were higher overall in RRT variability.   
Research has attributed the mu and sigma parameters to sensory-motor and automatic 
processes, whereas the tau parameter has been linked with higher-level controlled 
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processes (Hohle, 1965). However, others have argued that it is not accurate to directly link 
cognitive processes to parameter values (Heathcote et al., 1991; Matzke & Wagenmakers, 
2009). Nonetheless, understanding the distribution of data can help inform characteristics 
of these processes and guide theoretical development (e.g., Schmiedek et al., 2007). For 
example, the tau parameter and the slowest responses on performance tasks have been 
associated with diminished executive control and attention lapses (as indexed by reaction 
time; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010). Although previous research has linked 
lapses of attention to the tau parameter (and thus the slowest responses on a task), no 
studies have examined the ex-Gaussian distribution of performance variability across self-
reported attention states as in the current study. The results here further demonstrate the 
tendency for RRT variance to increase from on-task to the inattentive state, as first 
indicated by the parametric analysis described earlier. In addition, the ex-Gaussian analysis 
provides descriptive value and insight into the mechanisms underlying each attention state. 
From these distributions, one can speculate about the mechanisms underlying these 
attention lapses. For example, the increased variability in performance variance across 
trials can reflect reduced efficiency in information processing (Hawkins, Mittner, Boekel, 
Heathcote, & Forstmann, 2015), perhaps due to increased disengagement from the task at 
hand (Cheyne et al., 2009). In contrast, the efficiency in information processing during on-
task performance may be driven by stable engagement in the task at hand. Furthermore, 
the fact that in increased distraction states (viz. off-task and inattention states) performance 
variance is not just consistently increased compared to on-task but rather it itself varies 
across trials suggests that there is an increased volatility and unpredictability in the 
processes underlying these states. 
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4.2 Neural Correlates of Attention States 
As in previous research, the fMRI whole brain analysis of the Prompt 1 attention 
states demonstrated increased activation in several DMN regions when participants were 
off-task or otherwise distracted. When collapsing across all forms of distraction, activation 
was observed across the brain and concentrated in several DMN regions, including the left 
inferior frontal gyrus and middle orbital/medial PFC. A small but significant cluster of 
activity was also observed in the left parahippocampul gyrus of the MTL during distraction 
states. Interestingly, and discussed further below, there was a large cluster of activation 
observed in the left motor regions. 
Despite previous findings (Stawarczyk et al., 2011b), there was no significant activity 
in the TRI attention state compared to on-task. Furthermore, there was no significant 
activity in the TRI state when compared to the off-task state. This may be due to overlap 
in the processes occurring in the TRI state, which could be characteristic of either on-task 
and off-task, and thus the detection of unique TRI-related brain regions was hampered. The 
TRI state is characterized by thoughts related to the task, such as how well one is 
performing or the purpose of the task. Although specific thoughts likely varied across 
participants, the general nature of this attention state suggests that it may recruit a set of 
mechanisms consisting of frontoparietal control regions to guide evaluation and question 
formation as well as DMN regions to guide the generation of TRI thought content and 
related topics.  
Using the on-task attention state for comparison, a conjunction analysis revealed 
similarities and differences between the off-task and inattentive states. Unique activity in 
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the off-task state, which was not present in the inattentive state, was observed in a large set 
of DMN and MTL regions, including the precuneus, parahippocampal gyrus, and inferior 
frontal gyrus. Activation in the insula was also observed. Furthermore, a second 
conjunction analysis testing for unique activation in the off-task state compared to both the 
inattentive and on-task conditions found a significant cluster of voxels in the left middle 
frontal gyrus, part of the FPCN. Together, these results replicate many previous research 
studies that associated DMN regions with off-task thought and highlight the involvement 
of executive function regions in supporting off-task thought (Christoff et al., 2009). These 
results also emphasize the role these regions may have specifically in off-task thought in 
contrast to other forms of distraction (e.g., inattentiveness) or distraction in general. 
Compared to on-task, both the off-task and inattention states yielded activation in the 
left inferior frontal gyrus and left ACC. In addition, unique to the inattentive state were 
patterns of activation in subregions of the ventral and dorsal ACC and left inferior frontal 
gyrus which were not overlapping with the off-task state. Whereas the ACC and IFG have 
been observed before during mind wandering, in the current research these regions were 
associated with the inattention state, a state which is likely further decoupled from the task 
and characterized by drowsiness or fatigue. In support of these findings, research linking 
fMRI with behavioral microsleeps during a vigilance task found increased activity in 
frontal and parietal regions, including the inferior frontal gyrus (Poudel, Innes, Bones, 
Watts, & Jones, 2014). The researchers speculated that this activity may be related to 
attempts to stay awake and restore responsiveness, as opposed to reflecting general 
drowsiness. A similar mechanism may have occurred in the participants of the current 
study. In addition, the ACC is a major node of the ascending arousal system (Poudel et al., 
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2014). Previous research linking BOLD signal with EEG-vigilance states found increased 
activation in the ACC and throughout the frontal cortex during the transition between 
wakefulness and sleep onset (Olbrich et al., 2009). 
In mind wandering research, attention states have been typically dichotomized into 
on-task or off-task, although a growing amount of research has further examined the 
diverse contents and dynamics that characterize attention (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2017). 
However, explicitly asking participants about their experience of inattentiveness is less 
common. This comes in contrast to the likelihood that participants can indeed be drowsy 
during experiments, as reported in other studies (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). 
Differentiating between general inattentiveness and active, off-task thought is important 
both theoretically and in practice. The current study revealed that a subset of brain regions 
is associated with both off-task thought and inattentiveness, but that unique brain regions 
can be tied to each attention state. 
Finally, activation over the left motor cortex was observed in both the off-task state 
and the inattentive state. Given that the MRT consisted of rhythmic tapping with the right 
index finger, this activity is likely reflective of the increased variability in these distraction 
states. Previous research also found increased fMRI activity in the left premotor cortex 
when attention lapses occurred in a behavioral task (Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & 
Woldorff, 2006). Another group of researchers recorded functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy during a vigilance task and observed increased primary motor cortex activity 
as a function of time on task (Derosiere, Billot, Ward, & Perrey, 2013). The authors 
suggested that cognitive demand increases based on time on task and that the heightened 
motor activity reflects the engagement of certain brain regions (e.g., motor cortex) needed 
 94 
to cope with the increase in cognitive demand. Finally, a recent fMRI study examining 
fluctuations during performance of the gradCPT observed increased motor cortex activity 
preceding commission errors (Fortenbaugh, Rothlein, McGlinchey, DeGutis, & Esterman, 
2018). In this case, the authors suggested that this activity could be related to a more pre-
potent response set leading to a failure to inhibit the upcoming response. In the current 
research, this increased motor cortex activation could be related to a failure to inhibit out-
of-sync MRT button-presses, or more generally, to periods of increased task demand 
(Derosiere et al., 2013). 
4.3 Dissociation of Performance and Attention States 
Overall, the MRT procedure demonstrated that, as predicted, RRT variance increased 
in distracted states and that this variance tended to increase as individuals lapsed further 
into distraction (e.g., inattentive state). Despite these overall patterns, there were still 
instances where participants reported being on task but their performance was relatively 
variable, and instances where participants reported being off task but their performance 
was relatively stable. Examining on-task and off-task attention states under conditions of 
high and low performance variability in the quadrant state analysis provided a more 
nuanced understanding of subjective and objective measures of attention and highlighted 
important considerations regarding subjectively and objectively-defined attention states.  
Overall, as expected, performance was worse during the off-task attention state 
compared to on-task. However, by taking a closer look at the data, additional subtle but 
consistent differences between performance and attention state emerged. RRT variance 
during on-task thoughts was, on average, less variable than during off-task thoughts. 
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However, the variance of RRT during off-low thoughts was still significantly greater 
compared to that of on-low thoughts. Conversely, the RRT variance of on-high thoughts 
was significantly less compared to that of off-high thoughts. These comparisons indicate 
the unique contribution that on-task and off-task attention states have on performance. 
When an individual is off-task, even their best performance does not match that of being 
completely on-task (i.e., subjectively on-task and low performance variability). When an 
individual is on-task, even their worst performance is better than that of being completely 
off-task (i.e., subjectively off-task and high-performance variability).  
Although these differences are small, these results may have important implications. 
For example, it may be the case that off-low and off-high reflect two distinct cognitive 
states. In support of this, a recent neural model of mind wandering (Mittner, Hawkins, 
Boekel, & Forstmann, 2016) proposed a conceptual distinction between 1) an off-focus 
state characterized by “tuning out” (e.g., Seli et al., 2013) where behavioral variability is 
moderately increased relative to on-task; and 2) an active mind-wandering state 
characterized by engagement with an internal stream of thought, where behavioral 
variability is highest relative to on-task. Perhaps the off-low condition in the current study 
corresponds with the off-focus state of Mittner et al. (2016), whereas the off-high condition 
corresponds with the active mind wandering state. From this model, it is not clear the 
implication of the on-high condition. However, in general one can speculate that it is 
possible that this condition reflects periods of task performance where participants noticed 
they were off-task, and actively concentrated on the task to attempt to steady their 
performance (similar to that described by Hasenkamp et al., 2012). 
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Alternatively, the behavioral results can be interpreted within the framework of the 
context regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). As discussed earlier, 
the context regulation hypothesis drives several predictions regarding performance and off-
task thought. Specifically, when task demands are low, individuals often have the ability 
to lapse into mind wandering processes while maintaining steady performance. However, 
when task demands increase, performance tends to drop as one engages in mind wandering. 
Although the task demands of Study 1 were not explicitly manipulated, it is possible that 
participants perceived changes in cognitive demand as attention fluctuated (Kucyi et al., 
2016a), perhaps as a function of the disengagement of sensory or cognitive networks 
needed to perform the task (Derosiere et al., 2013). If this is the case, then the off-high 
condition could indicate temporary increases in cognitive demand, where performance 
falters as an individual engages in off-task thought. Furthermore, the off-low performance 
instances could reflect a state in which task demands were low, and participants could 
engage in off-task thought with less detriment to performance. 
What is particularly interesting is that these results are significantly different yet 
overall rather similar. That is, the RRT variance in the off-low condition was significantly 
greater than the RRT variance in the on-low condition. However, despite the difference, 
the sheer magnitude between off-low (M = 7.22) and on-low (M = 6.87) is very similar. 
This would not necessarily be expected in an off-task state, where performance variance 
would be predicted to be consistently and considerably larger compared to an on-task state 
given the numerous negative effects of distraction. For many intents and purposes, it may 
be sufficient to group the off-low performance into an overall “on-task” attention state 
defined behaviorally. Likewise, it may be sufficient to group the on-high performance into 
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an overall “off-task” attention state defined behaviorally. Yet, by incorporating thought 
probes that specifically addressed on-task and off-task subjective attention states, subtle 
differences emerged that have interesting implications. Given that attention states fluctuate 
over the course of the task, could being in a subjective off-task state make it harder to 
transition to being fully on-task? Furthermore, is an individual more likely to further error 
when in a subjective off-task state, even if task performance is relatively stable? These are 
research questions that can be addressed to further understand the relationship between 
subjective attention states and performance.  
Along with performance variability, neural activity was also examined in the 
quadrant state analysis. Although most whole-brain contrasts did not yield significant 
results, comparing off-high to on-high showed extensive activity throughout the brain in 
the off-high condition. Similar to the results of Prompt 1 described above, this activity was 
observed in areas belonging to the DMN as well as the FPCN, DAN, and motor cortex. 
Similar but less extensive results were observed when comparing activation in off-high to 
on-low.  
The percent signal change analysis within the DMN provided a closer look at how 
activity in this network changed across the different conditions. As expected, overall there 
was increased DMN activity during the off-task state compared to on-task. In addition, 
although not significant, there was a trend in the interaction between attention state and 
performance. Interestingly, the pattern of results (Figure 19) is reminiscent of findings from 
Esterman et al. (2012) and Kucyi et al. (2016b). Both studies found increased DMN activity 
during periods of low performance variability in continuous tasks. Although the current 
results are not significant and should be interpreted cautiously, a trend suggests that both 
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the on-low condition and off-low condition were associated with moderate levels of DMN 
activity relative to the other conditions. Similar to the interpretations provided by Esterman 
et al. (2012) and Kucyi et al. (2016b), this moderate amount of DMN activity may support 
the steady performance observed in both conditions, akin to an “in the zone” state where 
performance is optimal.  
The research by Esterman et al. (2012) and Kucyi et al. (2016b) documented 
moderate amounts of DMN activity with stable behavioral performance. However, DMN 
activity has been consistently associated with mind wandering and corresponds with 
decreases in performance (Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2017). One goal of 
the current work in the quadrant analysis was to investigate these seemingly contradictory 
findings. Similar to this current work, Kucyi and colleagues (2016a) measured both 
behavioral variability and self-reported attention state throughout performance of the 
gradCPT. However, the current results did not replicate their findings. Kucyi et al. (2016a) 
found independent, additive effects of attention state and performance on DMN activity. 
In addition, they found the greatest amount of DMN activity in the off-task, stable 
performance condition whereas there was a moderate amount of DMN activity during both 
on-task, stable performance and off-task, variable performance. The authors suggested that 
these findings are evidence that DMN activity may independently reflect both mind 
wandering and stable performance, perhaps due to separate neurophysiological processes. 
In the current study, however, increased DMN activity was associated with the off-task 
state in general, and there was a trend in the interaction between attention state and 
performance. These data suggest that instead of independent neurophysiological processes, 
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the DMN more broadly tracks general off-task processes, or, in the case of the trending 
interaction, that the role of the DMN is similar to that proposed by Esterman et al. (2012). 
Mind wandering is a heterogenous phenomenon that can be described by many 
characteristics, including by a hierarchy of disengagement (e.g., Mittner et al., 2016, 
Cheyne et al., 2009) and by its dynamics (Christoff et al., 2016). In fact, in response to the 
study by Kucyi et al. (2016a), Csifcsak and Mittner (2017) suggested that one reason the 
researchers may have observed greater DMN activity in both self-reported mind wandering 
and stable behavior is that the predominant form of off-task thought in that study could 
have been the “off-focus” state of mind wandering described in the model of Mittner et al. 
(2016). Along with moderate increases in performance variability, this model states that 
off-focus mind wandering is characterized by increased activity in core regions of the DMN 
(e.g., the PCC and mPFC) and is more common in demanding tasks with complex stimuli, 
such as the gradCPT used by Kucyi et al. (2016a). Although a direct parallel between the 
model of Mittner et al. (2016) and the attention states of the current research cannot be 
drawn, it is important to note that in the off-task attention state participants reported both 
spontaneous and constrained thoughts as well as internally and externally-driven thoughts. 
Due to the small number of reports in each of the attention states of the quadrant analysis, 
it was not possible to further analyze them with respect to their dynamics or environment. 
However, overall, especially within the context of the simple MRT procedure, it is possible 
that participants experienced more variety of off-task thoughts in the current study than did 
the participants in Kucyi et al. (2016a). These findings further highlight the implications 
that mind wandering characteristics and task context have on elucidating the mechanisms 
supporting attention states.  
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The quadrant state analysis was designed to provide a more nuanced look at the 
relationship between performance variability and self-reported attention focus. The 
behavioral data demonstrate that, in general, performance variability increased during the 
off-task attention state compared to the on-task state. Paired contrasts in the whole-brain 
fMRI analysis also distinguished between off-task and on-task, particularly when off-task 
performance was most extreme (viz. high variability). Similarly, analysis of DMN percent 
signal change showed increased neural activity in the off-task state compared to the on-
task state, thus replicating the multitude of previous studies that have documented this 
relationship between DMN and off-task states or mind wandering (Fox et al., 2015).  
The behavioral results also provide indication for a small but significant dissociation 
between subjective attention state and performance. The pattern of behavioral performance 
here fits well with the model of disengagement proposed by Cheyne et al. (2009) and may 
simply reflect an extension of the four broad attention states examined in Prompt 1. 
However, the same pattern did not extend to DMN activity. There are several reasons why 
this may have occurred. One reason is that there may not have been enough power to detect 
further differences, as suggested by the trending but nonsignificant interaction. Because 
the on-task and off-task attention states were subsequently divided into high and low 
variability performance based on the upper and lower thirds of RRT data, there were a 
relatively few number of trials that went into analysis. In addition, the DMN was defined 
broadly, based on the parcellation of Yeo et al. (2011). However, as proposed by Mittner 
et al. (2016) and others (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2017), subsystems of the DMN along with 
other large-scale networks may drive differences in attention state and performance, 
whereas core DMN regions may be common to many off-task thoughts and attention states 
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in general. In general, it is possible that neural activity as measured here provides a coarser 
assessment of off-task states in relation to behavior, where DMN activity tracks overall, 
general differences in on-task and off-task states. In contrast, the simple, continuous nature 
of the MRT procedure captures subtle but important fluctuations within attention states. 
4.4 Environmental and Dynamic Characteristics of Off-Task Thoughts 
When participants indicated that their attention was off-task, they were then prompted 
with two additional questions regarding the focus of their off-task thoughts. These prompts 
addressed the environmental orientation of their thoughts (whether the thoughts were 
internally or externally-focused) and the dynamics of their thoughts (whether the thoughts 
were spontaneous or constrained). These prompts provided a way to examine more detailed 
characteristics of off-task thoughts and potential interactions between them.  
In general, there were too few externally-focused attention states reported to examine 
the neural correlates of dynamic and constrained external thoughts. Therefore, to examine 
the neural correlates of environmental orientation, a whole brain fMRI analysis was 
conducted to compare internal and external thoughts overall. To examine the neural 
correlates of thought dynamics, analysis was performed on just internally-focused 
spontaneous and constrained thoughts. In terms of environmental orientation, there were 
small but significant differences in the whole brain analysis between the internal and 
external attention states. In particular, external thoughts were associated with activity in 
the right anterior IPL and right insula, consistent with externally-oriented attention and 
saliency processing, respectively (Christoff et al., 2016). In addition, activation was 
observed for externally-focused attention in right Heschl’s gyrus. This is consistent with 
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auditory processing and suggests that many externally-oriented thoughts were likely 
focused on surrounding sounds (e.g., the MRI scanner; Ellamil et al., 2016). 
The framework proposed by Christoff et al. (2016) predicts that spontaneously 
directed thoughts are supported primarily by the medial temporal lobes and DMN regions. 
In line with this, functional connectivity analysis showed significant, positive connectivity 
in bilateral hippocampus during spontaneous thoughts. However, increased fMRI 
activation was observed in the left hippocampus for constrained thoughts as opposed to 
spontaneous thoughts. In addition, a small increase in functional connectivity across the 
DMN was observed for constrained compared to spontaneous thoughts. This is opposite of 
the original prediction one might have. Although it is not directly clear the mechanisms 
these patterns represent, it is possible that the increased DMN functional connectivity 
during constrained thoughts reflects an increased level of homogeneity in processing across 
the network, perhaps driven by another set of brain regions or networks. For example, 
previous research found increased functional connectivity between the DMN and FPCN 
during autobiographical planning but found increased functional connectivity between the 
FPCN and DAN during visuospatial planning (Spreng et al., 2010). Building on this, a 
previous functional connectivity study incorporating graph theory analytics found that the 
FPCN was functionally interposed between the DMN and the DAN (Spreng, Sepulcre, 
Turner, Stevens, & Schacter, 2013). In support of this in the current study, there was a 
marginal yet non-significant increase in connectivity between the DMN and FPCN during 
constrained thoughts, suggesting that to a small degree, the two networks function 
coherently to drive certain attention states. Finally, although increased connectivity was 
observed in the bilateral hippocampus during spontaneous thoughts, DMN connectivity 
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overall was decreased relative to FPCN connectivity during spontaneous thoughts. Similar 
to above, it is possible that this pattern reflects the variable, dynamic processing in the 
DMN that is needed to drive the spontaneous thoughts (Ellamil et al., 2016). In general, 
these results provide the first empirical evidence of the dynamics of attention states as 
predicted by previous theorizing (Christoff et al., 2016).  
Pupil diameter measurements also showed interesting patterns across spontaneous 
and constrained attention states. There was a significant interaction between environment 
and dynamics. Specifically, within the internally-focused attention state, the average size 
in pupil diameter was smaller for spontaneous thoughts compared to constrained thoughts, 
the latter which was comparable in size to the baseline period. Spontaneous thoughts can 
be described as mental states that arise freely, and where the transitions between content 
flow with little effort (Christoff et al., 2016). In addition, Lenartowicz et al. (2013) argue 
that the effect of the LC-NE system drives different qualities of thought based on arousal 
level. Specifically, Lenartowicz et al. state that low arousal may be associated with mind 
wandering, where thoughts drift from one topic to another similar to the characteristics of 
spontaneous thought described by Christoff et al. (2016). Given that pupil diameter has 
been shown to follow an inverted-U shape in relation to attention and arousal (Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005), the decrease in pupil diameter observed here during spontaneous thoughts 
may correspond to an overall change from constrained, focused periods of thought to the 
dynamic, effortless form of spontaneous thought that may occur during lower levels of 
arousal (Unsworth & Robison, 2018). Furthermore, pupil diameter of the constrained 
attention state did not change from baseline, suggesting that the constrained attention state 
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reflects an arousal level similar to that during baseline, when participants are likely focused 
and constrain their thoughts in preparation for the upcoming trial. 
Finally, there were no significant differences in RRT variability within environments 
or dynamics, nor was there a significant interaction between the two. Regardless of the 
orientation of one’s off-task thought, performance was not affected. Although this null 
result does not rule out the possibility that behavioral performance differs between these 
attentions states in other contexts (see Study 2), the findings here demonstrate how an 
integrative, multimodal approach in neuroscience can elucidate differences between 
cognitive processes. Although RRT variance did not differ across environments or 
dynamics in Study 1, pupil diameter and BOLD signal metrics helped begin to clarify the 
neural mechanisms of thought dynamics. 
4.5 Cognitive Load, Attention States, and Performance 
A number of emerging studies have implicated the role that task difficulty may have 
on mind wandering (e.g., Levinson et al., 2012). Although it is rather unsurprising that 
mind wandering increases during easy tasks, some studies suggest that certain 
characteristics of off-task thought, such as intentionality, may be more prominent under 
some task conditions than others (Seli et al., 2016, Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016b). 
In addition, the context regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013) 
makes predictions regarding the role of executive function in mind wandering that can be 
tested across levels of cognitive demand. Study 2 provided a way to test directly the effect 
of cognitive load on attention states and performance. Here, task difficulty was 
manipulated by changing the tapping patterns. The easy condition simply required 
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participants to tap in sync to the metronome as in Study 1. The difficult condition required 
participants to perform two different tap patterns based on the pitch of the metronome, 
which could change randomly throughout each tap period. As expected, more off-task 
thoughts were reported during the easy condition compared to the difficult condition, and 
more on-task thoughts were reported during the difficult condition compared to the easy 
condition. Relatedly, off-task thoughts comprised the majority of the Prompt 1 attention 
states in the easy condition, and on-task thoughts comprised the majority of the attention 
states in the difficult condition.  
In the context regulation hypothesis, Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna (2013) propose 
that the role of executive function in mind wandering varies as a function of the relative 
demands of the external task. When the task is difficult, executive control is used to drive 
task processing and minimize mind wandering. When the task is easy, executive control 
may maximize the occurrence of off-task thought. Since constrained thoughts are thought 
to largely be supported by executive function and the FPCN (Christoff et al., 2016), it 
stands to reason that these types of off-task thoughts are more prevalent in easy tasks. The 
rates of each type of off-task thought dynamic in Study 2 begin to suggest this pattern. In 
Study 2, visual inspection of Figure 23 indicates that the easy condition yielded relatively 
more constrained thoughts (M = 47%) compared to the difficult condition (M = 39%). In 
addition, spontaneous thoughts were more frequent than constrained thoughts within the 
difficult level (M = 61% vs M = 39%). However, these results did not quite reach statistical 
significance and should be interpreted cautiously. Furthermore, performance variance also 
changed as a function of task level and thought dynamic. Specifically, within the easy 
condition, mean RRT variance was lower for constrained thoughts than spontaneous 
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thoughts. In addition, when experiencing constrained thoughts, there was a trend for RRT 
variance to increase in the difficult task condition than the easy task condition. 
Within the easy condition, mean RRT variance was lower for constrained thoughts 
than spontaneous thoughts. Conversely, there was no difference in RRT variance between 
the spontaneous and constrained attention states within the difficult condition. In other 
words, participants performed better in the easy condition when experiencing constrained 
thoughts relative to spontaneous thoughts, and they performed equally poorly in the 
difficult condition when experiencing either type of thought state. Furthermore, there was 
no significant difference between RRT variance of spontaneous thoughts in the easy 
condition and both spontaneous and constrained thoughts in the difficult condition. As 
discussed above, the context regulation hypothesis has implicated that under easy task 
conditions, individuals often mind wander because they can do so with little detriment to 
their performance (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). However, the results here illustrate that 
it may not be mind wandering in general that drives this relationship with performance. 
Rather, the dynamics of the thought one is engaged in is strongly related to performance 
during a task, particularly when the task is easy. In this case of low cognitive load, 
constrained thought is associated with steady, less variable performance, whereas 
spontaneous thought is associated with more variable performance. Although it is not clear 
the mechanism behind this distinction, it is possible that little executive control was needed 
to implement the task in the easy condition, and thus the executive control that was 
allocated could drive off-task, constrained thought, somewhat like a dual-task process 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2017). Periodically executive control may drop, thus resulting in 
diminished performance as well as increases in spontaneous off-task thought (McVay & 
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Kane, 2010). Given the increased need for executive control to perform the task in the 
difficult condition, both forms of off-task thought were associated with worse performance. 
Overall, these results provide support for both the context regulation hypothesis and the 
framework of Christoff et al. (2016), as well as provide new evidence for how specific 
dynamics of off-task thought may affect performance. 
Regarding the environmental orientation of off-task thoughts, internal thoughts were 
relatively more frequent than external thoughts in both the easy and difficult conditions. 
This replicates the overall findings in Study 1 as well as previous work that has observed 
relatively more internally-oriented thoughts during off-task states (Unsworth & Robison, 
2016). In general, this result is not surprising given the stable, uninspiring external 
environment in which participants completed the experiment. Analysis of behavioral 
performance across the Prompt 1 attention states showed that RRT variance was increased 
across task levels during the inattentive condition relative to on-task. However, unlike in 
Study 1, there was no significant difference in RRT variance between the on-task attention 
state and either the TRI or the off-task state. In addition, in Study 2, there was a significant 
difference in RRT variance between spontaneous and constrained attention states in the 
easy task level. However, there were no differences in RRT variance between these 
attention states in Study 1, even though the tasks were the same. What could account for 
these differences? Although the MRT procedure itself was the same for Study 1 and the 
easy condition of Study 2, other factors may have influenced performance across the tasks. 
Study 1 was run in the MRI scanner, and additional instructions were given to participants 
to remain very still and to keep focus on the center of the screen at all times for eye tracking. 
These situations may have made the overall task more challenging. In support of this, the 
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overall RRT variance was slightly, but not significantly, greater in Study 1 than the easy 
condition of Study 2. Another interesting perspective comes from research on vigilance 
and intervening tasks (Esterman & Rothlein, 2019). In a study by Ralph, Onderwater, 
Thomson, and Smilek (2017), participants performed a vigilance task either continuously 
or interspersed with either a break or a challenging visuospatial task. The researchers found 
that both the break and the challenging task alleviated the vigilance decrement in RT, 
suggesting that highly demanding tasks can enhance effortful processing across other 
conditions, perhaps by increasing general arousal (Ralph et al., 2017). A similar effect may 
have occurred in Study 2, where the difficult level provided a “break” from the monotony 
of the easy level. In general, the current results support the evidence that off-task thought 
is a heterogenous construct and its characteristics and implications in performance can be 
modulated based on the task at hand (e.g., Unsworth & Robison, 2018). 
4.6 General Discussion 
The current set of studies incorporated a simple performance task with multimodal 
cognitive neuroscience methods to investigate attention lapses. Two major sets of results 
emerged from this investigation along performance and dynamics. Regarding performance, 
RRT variance dissociated several different forms of attention lapses (e.g., inattention, off-
task thought) and highlighted subtle but important distinctions between subjective attention 
reports and behavioral performance. Namely, on-low thoughts were consistently associated 
with decreased variance compared to off-low thoughts. Similarly, off-high thoughts were 
consistently associated with increased variance compared to on-high thoughts. Regarding 
dynamics, unique patterns of BOLD signal and pupil diameter were identified for 
spontaneous and constrained thoughts. For example, pupil diameter during spontaneous 
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thoughts was significantly smaller compared to constrained thoughts with respect to 
baseline. In addition, functional connectivity was observed between the bilateral 
hippocampal regions during spontaneous thoughts. These behavioral and brain imaging 
differences offer a novel way to characterize the dynamics of off-task thoughts, which up 
until now research has ignored. Investigation of these dynamics in Study 2 provided further 
insight into how cognitive load can affect attention lapses and task performance. 
One goal of this study was to isolate patterns of neural activity specific to each state 
in the quadrant state analysis. A set of predictions was made based on assumed levels of 
cognitive demand that fluctuated across each state. For example, the off-low condition 
could have reflected periods of low cognitive load when participants could mind wander 
with little detriment to task performance. In these instances, interactions between the DMN 
and FPCN should be observed. The off-high condition could have reflected periods of 
increased cognitive demand where performance declines when mind wandering occurs, 
and increased DMN activity would be observed. However, these predictions were not 
supported by the data. Instead, DMN percent signal change increased in off-task thoughts 
overall compared to on-task thoughts. In addition, there were no differences between the 
on-low and off-low conditions in the whole brain analysis, including within the DMN or 
FPCN. However, there was increased activity across the brain, including the DMN and a 
range of “task positive” brain regions, in the off-high condition compared to the on-low 
condition. Although it is possible that the relatively small sample sizes within each 
condition may have limited the results, it is clear that the original hypotheses are not 
supported. 
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An issue arising from the predictions above is that they were generated post-hoc, and 
that the differences in cognitive demand were merely assumed yet not actually 
manipulated. Although it is possible that cognitive demand inherently fluctuates across task 
even when the task itself is constant (Derosiere et al., 2013), the results from Study 2 
suggest this may be less likely than originally considered. For example, in the difficult 
condition of Study 2, participants reported relatively more spontaneous thoughts than 
constrained thoughts, a finding that is in line with the context regulation hypothesis 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). If cognitive load did vary between the off-low and 
off-high conditions of Study 1, then it would be likely that the proportion of these attention 
states would too. However, across the four quadrants of Study 1, the proportion of 
spontaneous and constrained thoughts was consistent between the off-low (Mspont = .634, 
SEMspont = .04) and off-high conditions (Mspont = .629, SEMspont = .05). 
A different approach to understanding performance and off-task thought is from the 
perspective of task engagement. The idea that off-task thought is characterized by 
perceptual decoupling has been addressed in previous research (Smallwood et al., 2011), 
and a recent model builds on this idea by organizing attention across three states: on-task, 
off-focus, and active mind wandering (Mittner et al., 2016). These attention states further 
correspond with the task engagement levels proposed by Cheyne et al. (2009) and with the 
distinction between “tuning out” versus “zoning out” in previous mind wandering literature 
(Seli et a., 2013). The current study did not explicitly ask participants regarding their level 
of engagement across the task. Therefore, it is unclear the true extent to which they were 
engaged at any given time. However, the distinctions outlined by Mittner and colleagues 
(2016) align nicely with the differences in RRT variance observed in the quadrant analysis, 
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along with the monotonic pattern of behavioral performance across the Prompt 1 attention 
states in Study 1. Future research could measure or actively manipulate the level of 
engagement throughout tasks to study these processes further. 
In general, people engage in off-task thoughts when the topics of those thoughts are 
more attractive or compelling than the task that one is performing (Mittner et al., 2016). 
The mechanisms supporting these thoughts as well as the task at hand are driven by a 
complex set of processes that likely involve a dynamic balancing between cognitive 
representations (e.g., task files; Bezdek, Godwin, Smith, Hazeltine, & Schumacher, 2018) 
of one’s current goals, interests, and concerns (Klinger, 1999; Klinger, Marchetti, & 
Koster, 2018; McVay & Kane, 2010). As described in Bezdek et al. (2018), over the course 
of cognitive processing, these representations compete with each other to further drive 
mental contents and behavior. In this sense, one’s “off-task” thoughts may very much be 
considered “on-task” to the individual if these thoughts align with the individual’s true 
goals and not the task at the moment. Content related to these “on-task” thoughts may be 
driven spontaneously, perhaps by neural mechanisms within the hippocampus and medial 
temporal lobes (Ellamil et al., 2016). In this sense, executive function is important for 
minimizing the occurrence of such intrusions and maintaining focus on the task at hand 
(McVay & Kane, 2010). However, once an individual lapses into off-task (or, “on-task”) 
thought (whether intentionally or unintentionally; Seli et al., 2016), the extent to which 
executive control is used to guide these thoughts in a directed manner can depend on the 
task demands itself (e.g., some tasks do not require much executive control) and perhaps 
the extent to which one remains engaged in the task. As demonstrated in Study 2, the 
difficult task level resulted in a relative drop in the proportion of constrained compared to 
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spontaneous attention states, and performance quality suffered when constrained thoughts 
were experienced in the difficult level. While this is predicted by the context regulation 
hypothesis, a more general perspective of the relation between off-task thought and 
performance can be gained by thinking of off-task thought as encompassing one of many 
goals of the individual (Bezdek et al., 2018, Klinger et al., 2018), the extent to which one 
engages in the task or in off-task thought, and the roles that executive control can serve 
during performance (McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
An overarching goal of Study 1 was to apply a triangulation approach to study 
attention lapses by incorporating complementary cognitive neuroscience methodologies: 
behavioral performance, fMRI, pupillometry, and self-report. Combined, these 
methodologies helped elucidate the neural correlates of attention states, albeit to different 
extents. When examining the attention states of Prompt 1, both behavioral performance 
and BOLD signal in fMRI uniquely characterized several attention states. In addition, 
despite the lack of behavioral differences, unique BOLD signatures were found for both 
environmental and dynamic characteristics of off-task thought, and the dynamics of 
thought were further characterized by differences in functional connectivity. Although 
there were no differences in pupil diameter across the four attention states of Prompt 1, 
pupil diameter differentiated internally-focused spontaneous and constrained thoughts in 
line with hypotheses regarding off-task thought and arousal (Lenartowicz et al., 2013).  
Triangulation can be a powerful method in neuroscience. This is especially the case 
in areas of research such as mind wandering. Converging results across different 
methodologies provide support for characteristics of attention lapses that are otherwise 
only reported subjectively (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Together, the multimodal set of 
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results from Study 1 help to further outline the characteristics that attention states can take. 
Although this provides important value from a descriptive viewpoint, this multimodal 
approach also provided an opportunity to test different theories and frameworks of mind 
wandering, such as the brain mechanisms supporting thought dynamics and the effect of 
task demand.  
Not all methods yielded significant differences across comparisons, suggesting that 
some methods might be more sensitive to certain facets of attention lapses than others. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that there are different or more subtle features that should 
be analyzed within these methods. For example, use of MVPA has grown quickly in recent 
years due to its multivariate analysis approach to fMRI data. Studies have suggested that 
MVPA may be more sensitive compared to other analyses with respect to detecting 
cognitive states (e.g., Serences & Saproo, 2012). Furthermore, applying classifiers to 
multimodal data can provide further insight to mind wandering. For example, Mittner et 
al. (2014) incorporated features from fMRI and pupil diameter into a support vector 
machine classifier to predict self-reported mind wandering scores. In this analysis, the 
researchers found that a set of features consisting of fMRI activation and functional 
connectivity in the default mode and task-positive networks along with pupil diameter 
provided the best classification results. 
The MRT procedure used in these studies provided a simple, continuous measure of 
behavioral performance. As discussed earlier, this simple method overcomes many of the 
limitations that tasks such as the SART have in terms of response selection and other 
additional cognitive processes. Therefore, the MRT provided a cleaner context in which to 
study the unfolding of attention states and distractions. In addition, incorporating the MRT 
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provides a perspective on mind wandering from a context different from the typical go/no-
go inhibitory tasks (e.g., SART, gradCPT) that have frequently been used to study off-task 
thought. However, it is uncertain the extent to which this task can generalize. The effects 
of distraction on performance as well as the neural and physiological correlates of off-task 
thought can be task-dependent. For example, there were no differences in pupil diameter 
across the four attention states of Prompt 1, despite previous research documenting 
differences in similar attention states (Unsworth & Robison, 2016). It may be the case that 
the MRT generalizes well to other tasks that are simple and continuous in nature. On the 
other hand, other results from this current work do illustrate the generalizability of the 
MRT procedure. Most prominently, increased RRT variance was observed across 
distraction states. This replicates not just research that has used the MRT previously (Seli 
et al., 2013), but also research that uses response inhibition tasks including the gradCPT 
(Esterman et al. 2012; Kucyi et al., 2016a) and SART (Bastian & Sackur, 2013). In 
addition, the current work, and much of the reviewed literature here, approached attention 
states from a general population perspective. However, there is large variability across 
individuals in terms of their ability to focus and tendencies to mind wander (Godwin et al., 
2017). Individual differences such as working memory capacity (Levinson et al., 2012) and 
state characteristics such as current motivation and interest (Kane et al., 2017; Seli, Cheyne, 
Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015) can play substantial roles in the occurrence of mind 
wandering and its effect on performance. Ultimately, a complete understanding of off-task 
thoughts, their effect on performance, and their neural mechanisms will be generated from 
a range of diverse contexts, measures, and individuals.  
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Attention lapses are multi-faceted and studying them is complex. The pattern of 
behavioral performance in Study 1 strongly suggests that mind wandering and attention 
lapses should be considered from a perspective of disengagement. Although 
disengagement was not directly measured or manipulated here, the monotonic increase in 
RRT variance from on-task to the inattentive state indicates increasing disengagement 
similar to that described by others (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2009). This perspective may prove 
increasingly fruitful in understanding the neural mechanisms of off-task thought (e.g., 
Mittner et al., 2016) and helps move away from the content-based mind wandering 
approach that has been criticized by others (e.g., Christoff et al., 2016). Investigation of the 
dynamics of mind wandering in the current studies yielded novel neuroimaging findings 
and theoretically-relevant behavioral results. Incorporating measures of thought dynamics, 
that is, the extent to which information processing occurs in a spontaneous or constrained 
manner, has important implications for understanding the role of brain regions and large-
scale networks, as demonstrated with the current data. Ultimately, approaching mind 
wandering research from a combination of task disengagement and the ongoing cognitive 
and neural dynamics can provide tangible research goals and a more complete 
understanding of the complex, multi-faceted nature of mind wandering.  
Last, it is important to comment on some of the real-world implications of this 
research. Although the studies conducted here were laboratory studies designed to examine 
aspects of attention and performance within an experimental setting, there is also 
significance to applied settings. Mind wandering has traditionally been considered a 
negative consequence of executive control failures, resulting in increased performance 
variability and errors. This was observed in the current data as well. However, emerging 
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research argues that there are benefits to mind wandering. In addition, the data in Study 2 
speak to the idea that the dynamics of off-task state may ultimately determine whether 
performance is as detrimental as typically considered. Moving forward, researchers and 
applied scientists should consider the implications of task context, disengagement, and 
thought dynamics in real-world applications. In the future, we may ultimately be able to 
develop teaching methods, therapeutic approaches, and incorporate various environmental 
settings that minimize detrimental instances of mind wandering and encourage beneficial 













APPENDIX A. ATTENTION STATE DEFINITIONS AND 
EXAMPLES 
Below is the script that is read to participants so they can learn about the different 
off-task thought states. Most of these examples were taken from Christoff et al. (2016). 
The examples illustrate how external/internal and constrained/spontaneous are independent 
dimensions, and thoughts can be either external or internal AND constrained or 
spontaneous. 
--- 
When we are thinking about things other than the task we’re doing, it’s possible for our 
thoughts to be oriented either ‘externally’ or ‘internally’. Externally-oriented thoughts are 
focused on things surrounding us in our environment, such as sights, sounds, smells, and 
bodily sensations (hunger/thirst/temperature). Internally-oriented thoughts are focused on 
things in our mind, such as thinking about the upcoming weekend or your last vacation. 
Here are some examples: 
Internally-oriented: 
-While re-painting the walls of their room, a person plans their afternoon, figuring out how 
to combine multiple errands into a single car ride 
-Despite their best attempts to write a paper, a student keeps fixating on a harsh comment 
from their teacher 
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- While driving in their car, a writer suddenly thinks of a line for the book they are writing, 
then remembers that they must pick up dog food on the way home, before reminiscing 
about the winters of their childhood 
Externally-oriented: 
-to stay awake during a boring lecture, a student tries to estimate who has the most 
expensive shoes in the room 
-While listening to harsh criticism by the teacher, a student starts counting the tiles on the 
floor of the classroom as a means to stop from crying 
-While studying in a quiet library, a student finds himself unable to ignore a buzzing fly 
-While hiking on a forest trail, a hiker’s thoughts move from the gravel on the path to a 
slug crawling up a stump, and then to a leaf floating in a puddle 
 
In addition, when we are thinking about things other than the task we’re doing, it’s possible 
for our minds to move about ‘freely’ or for our thoughts to be ‘constrained’. When thoughts 
move about freely, thinking may appear more spontaneous and may jump from one content 
to another. When our thoughts are constrained, thinking may feel more deliberate or goal-




Here are some examples: 
Freely-moving: 
- While driving in their car, a writer suddenly thinks of a line for the book they are writing, 
then remembers that they must pick up dog food on the way home, before reminiscing 
about the winters of their childhood (internal) 
-While hiking on a forest trail, a hiker’s thoughts move from the gravel on the path to a 
slug crawling up a stump, and then to a leaf floating in a puddle (external) 
-As the child gazes out the window on the long plane flight, his thoughts drift from the 
clouds to the soothing motion of the plane, to the taste of ice cream leftover from a snack 
earlier (external) 
-While cleaning the kitchen, a student daydreams about their upcoming weekend getaway, 
and then thinks about the midterm exam they took the day before, and then remembers they 
should give their parents a call before leaving (internal) 
Constrained: 
-While re-painting the walls of their room, a person plans their afternoon, figuring out how 
to combine multiple errands into a single car ride (internal) 




-Despite their best attempts to write a paper, a student keeps fixating on a harsh comment 
from their teacher (internal) 
-While listening to harsh criticism by the teacher, a student starts counting the tiles on the 
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